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CORPORATE OFFICIALS BEWARE: CALDER V. JONES
MAY PIERCE YOUR FIDUCIARY SHIELD
I. INTRODUCTION
The "fiduciary shield" doctrine' "shields" corporate officials from the as-
sertion of personal jurisdiction by state and federal courts when such assertions
are based solely on activities conducted by those officials in their corporate ca-
pacities.2 The doctrine rests on the premise that activities taken by corporate
officials in their corporate capacities constitute acts by the corporations with
which those officials are affiliated, and are not acts of the individual officials
themselves.3 In that sense, the term "corporate official" has been defined to
include not only officers4 and directors,5 but also the shareholders,6 agents7 and
employees8 of corporations.
The fiduciary shield doctrine does not bar suit against corporate officials in
their individual capacities under all circumstances.' For instance, officials may
be subject to personal jurisdiction in states in which they are domiciled10 and in
other states with which they have sufficient minimum contacts1" in their individ-
ual capacities.12 Likewise, although the doctrine provides corporate officials
with a defense to the exercise of personal jurisdiction, it does not supply a simi-
lar defense to an action for personal liability.'
3
1. The "fiduciary shield" doctrine was first coined by United States v. Montreal Trust
Co., 358 F.2d 239, 243 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 919 (1966).
2. Marine Midland Bank v. Miller, 664 F.2d 899, 902-03 (2d Cir. 1981).
3. Mihlon v. Superior Court, 169 Cal. App. 3d 703, 713, 215 Cal. Rptr. 442, 447 (1985).
4. See, e.g., Bulova Watch Co. v. K. Hattori & Co., 508 F. Supl. 1322, 1349 (E.D.N.Y.
1981).
5. Id.
6. See, e.g., PSC Professional Servs. Group v. American Digital Sys., 555 F. Supp. 788,
794 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
7. See, e.g., Videotronics, Inc. v. Bend Elecs., 564 F. Supp. 1471, 1475 (D. Nev. 1983).
8. See, e.g., Ruger v. Superior Court, 118 Cal. App. 3d 427, 433-34, 173 Cal. Rptr. 302,
305-06 (1981).
9. See Axelrad v. Carl Byoir & Assocs., No. 84 Civ. 8936, at n.5 (S.D.N.Y. July 15, 1985)
(LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file) (mem.).
10. "Domicile" is "[t]hat place where a man has his true, fixed, and permanent home and
principal establishment, and to which whenever he is absent he has the intention of returning."
BLAcK's LAW DICTIoNARY 435 (5th ed. 1979).
11. "Minimum contacts" was the test established by the United States Supreme Court in
International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945), to determine whether a
court's assertion of personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant comports with constitu-
tional due process. See infra notes 20-68 and accompanying text for a discussion of personal
jurisdiction.
12. Axelrad, No. 84 Civ. 8936, LEXIS at n.5.
13. Marine Midland Bank, 384 U.S. at 902. Indeed, many courts have been troubled by
the fact that an individual could be personally liable for his activities within a state, but could
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The fiduciary shield doctrine has been the subject of great debate in state
and federal courts for many years. 14 The United States Supreme Court first
considered the application of the doctrine, without referring to it by name, in
1984, in Calder v. Jones.1 5 Unfortunately, the Supreme Court's decision only
added to the confusion, and the debate continues today. There are two issues
with which courts have struggled following the Calder decision: (1) whether the
fiduciary shield doctrine survived Calder ;16 and (2) if it did survive, whether the
doctrine is an element of the constitutional jurisdictional analysis or whether it is
an element of the statutory jurisdictional analysis. 7 Until these issues are re-
solved, corporate officials cannot be certain whether the actions they take on
behalf of the corporations they represent will subject them to personal jurisdic-
tion in states other than those in which they have sufficient contacts in their
individual capacities. As a result of this uncertainty, the liberty interests of non-
resident corporate officials, afforded by the due process clause of the United
States Constitution, are being violated.' 8
This Comment begins with a discussion of the issues courts need to con-
sider in establishing personal jurisdiction over non-resident defendants. Next, it
examines the history of the fiduciary shield doctrine, the policy reasons underly-
ing its creation, and the legal basis of the doctrine. Specifically, it analyzes the
United States Supreme Court's decision in Calder. This Comment then exam-
ines the effects that Calder has had on the fiduciary shield doctrine in the large
"corporate states" of California and New York, 19 and concludes with a survey
of Calder's effects on the doctrine in other states that have recognized it.
not be made amenable to suit within that state. See, eg., Columbia Briargate Co. v. First Nat'l
Bank, 713 F.2d 1052, 1059 (4th Cir.), cert denied sub nom. Pearson v. Columbia Briargate
Co., 465 U.S. 1007 (1984) (There would be an "'anamolous' result which would 'defeat the
purposes of the law creating substantive liability,' if the courts were 'to permit a corporate
officer to shield himself from jurisdiction by means of the corporate entity, when he could not
interpose the same shield as a defense against substantive liability'. . . ." (quoting Donner v.
Tams-Witmark Music Library, 480 F. Supp. 1229, 1234 (E.D. Pa. 1979))).
14. Taylor-Rush v. Multitech Corp., 217 Cal. App. 3d 103, 115-17, 265 Cal. Rptr. 672,
678-80 (1990).
15. 465 U.S. 783, 789-90 (1984).
16. See, e.g., Thomson McKinnon Sec. v. Hamiltonian Indus., 610 F. Supp. 5, 7 (S.D.N.Y.
1985).
17. Id
18. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980).
19. Although Delaware is generally looked to as the center of corporate law development,
its courts have had little occasion to address the fiduciary shield doctrine. Only one recent
Delaware case addresses the fiduciary shield issue, and this case does not mention Calder. See
Plummer & Co. Realtors v. Crisahi, 533 A.2d 1242 (Del. 1986). In Plummer, the Delaware
Supreme Court stated that, because the Delaware long-arm statute, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10,
§ 3104(c) (1974 & Supp. 1988), is based on the Illinois long-arm statute, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.
110, para. 2-209 (Smith-Hurd 1983), the Delaware courts look to the legislative and decisional
law of Illinois in interpreting their own statute. Plummer, 533 A.2d at 1246. Because Illinois
had adopted the fiduciary shield doctrine, Delaware also adopted the doctrine. Id. The Plum-
mer court applied the doctrine as a limitation on Delaware's long-arm statute, and not as a
consideration of due process. Id at 1246-48. The court also recognized an exception to the
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II. ESTABLISHING PERSONAL JURISDICrION OVER NON-RESIDENT
DEFENDANTS
Courts automatically have personal jurisdiction, assuming proper subject
matter, to hear cases involving defendants who reside within their boundaries.2°
Personal jurisdiction over non-resident defendants, however, is not automatic.
The scope of a court's jurisdiction over persons who do not reside within the
borders of the state in which the court sits is determined by two considerations:
(1) the state long-arm statute,21 which places state-created limitations on the
authority'of the state; and (2) the due process requirements of the United States
Constitution, which place constitutional limitations on the authority of the
states.22 Consequently, a court must satisfy two independent inquiries in order
to extend personal jurisdiction over a non-resident. 23 The first step is to deter-
mine whether the state long-arm statute allows the exercise of jurisdiction based
on the facts of the case.24 If the first inquiry is satisfied, the court then deter-
mines whether the exercise of jurisdiction would comport with the due process
requirements of the United States Constitution.25
Historically, the consent or the presence of a non-resident defendant within
a state's boundaries provided the basis upon which a state could exercise per-
sonal jurisdiction.26 Modem law recognizes a more flexible approach, the "min-
imum contacts" analysis, which allows the assertion of personal jurisdiction over
a non-resident based on the party's contacts with the forum state.27 In evaluat-
ing minimum contacts, a court focuses on the relationship among the defendant,
doctrine, stating that the doctrine wil not be applied when the corporation is a mere shell for
the corporate official. Id. at 124647.
20. J. FRIEDENTHAL, M. KANE & A. MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 3.6, at 110 (1985)
("availability of defendant's domicile as a proper forum assures that there is one place in which
defendant always may be sued").
21. The state statute defining jurisdictional limitations is typically referred to as a "long-
arm" statute. A long-arm statute allows a state to exercise jurisdiction over defendants not
found within its borders to the extent permitted under the due process clause. O'Hare Int'l
Bank v. Hampton, 437 F.2d 1173, 1176 (7th Cir. 1971).
22. See J. FRIEDENTHAL, M. KANE & A. MILLER, supra note 20, § 3.1, at 96-97.
23. Davis v. Metro Prods., 885 F.2d 515, 519 (9th Cir. 1989); Wines v. Lake Havasu Boat
Mfg., 846 F.2d 40,42 (8th Cir. 1988); Haisten v. Grass Valley Medical Reimbursement Fund,
784 F.2d 1392, 1396 (9th Cir. 1986); Garber v. Jack's Corn Crib, No. 4-86-740, at *12 (D.
Minn. July 18, 1988) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file).
24. Davis, 885 F.2d at 519; Wines, 846 F.2d at 42; Haisten, 784 F.2d at 1396; Garber, No.
4-86-740, LEXIS at *12.
25. Davis, 885 F.2d at 519; Wines, 846 F.2d at 42; Haisten, 784 F.2d at 1396; Garber, No.
4-86-740, LEXIS at *12; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
26. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 733 (1877).
27. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). Contra Burnham v.
Superior Court, 110 S. Ct. 2105 (1990) (plurality upheld assertion of personal jurisdiction over
a non-resident defendant based solely upon service of process within the forum state's terri-
tory); Note, International Shoe Gets the Boot: Burnham v. Superior Court Ressurrects the
Physical Power Theory, 24 Loy. L.A.L. Rev. 849 (1991) (discusses plurality opinion in
Burnham).
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the forum state, and the litigation.28
The requirements for asserting personal jurisdiction under long-arm stat-
utes vary among the states. Some long-arm statutes, such as New York's,
29
provide stricter limitations on the exercise of jurisdiction than those imposed
under the United States Constitution.30 Other long-arm statutes, such as Cali-
fornia's, 31 allow for the assertion of jurisdiction to the extent permitted by the
United States Constitution.32 Generally, a state long-arm statute may authorize
the exercise of jurisdiction to the outermost limits of due process, as permitted
by the United States Constitution, but it may not extend jurisdiction beyond that
point.
3 3
States have asserted jurisdiction over non-residents based upon a wide vari-
ety of contacts, including "the transaction of business in the state, the commis-
sion of any one of a series of enumerated acts within the state, such as the
commission of a tort, ownership of property, or entry into a contract, or, in
some cases, the commission of a particular act outside the forum that has conse-
quences within it."
34
The United States Supreme Court articulated the constitutional require-
ments for the exercise of personal jurisdiction over non-resident defendants in
the case of International Shoe Co. v. Washington.3 5 In International Shoe, the
Court held:
[D]ue process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a
judgment in personam, if he be not present within the territory of the
forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such that the mainte-
nance of the suit does not offend "traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice."
36
Consequently, the underlying concern in the constitutional analysis is that
before a court can exercise jurisdiction over a non-resident, that party must have
engaged in activities sufficient to satisfy the demands of due process.37 The
Supreme Court has stated that due process concerns are satisfied when: (1) the
28. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 204 (1977).
29. N.Y. Civ. P ~c. L. & R. § 302(a) (McKinney 1990. See infra note 217 for the text of
this statute.
30. See Bulk Oil (USA) v. Sun Oil Trading Co., 584 F. Supp. 36, 42 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
31. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 410.10 (West 1990). See infra note 176 for the text of this
statute.
32. See Cornelison v. Chaney, 16 Cal. 3d 143, 147, 545 P.2d 264, 266, 127 Cal. Rptr. 352,
354 (1976). In states where the long-arm statute is coextensive with due process, the two
inquiries merge, and the only inquiry is whether jurisdiction would be permissible under the
due process clause of the United States Constitution. Columbia Briargate Co. v. First Nat'l
Bank, 713 F.2d 1052, 1057 (4th Cir. 1983), cert. denied sub nom. Pearson v. Columbia Briar-
gate Co., 456 U.S. 1007 (1984).
33. J. LANDERS & J. MARTIN, CIVIL PROCEDURE, 100-01 (1981).
34. J. FRIEDENTHAL, M. KANE & A. MILLER, supra note 20, § 3.12, at 139-40.
35. 326 U.S 310, 316 (1945).
36. Id. (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
37. International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319.
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defendant has established sufficient minimum contacts with the forum state;3"
and (2) the assertion of jurisdiction comports with "traditional notions of fair
play and substantial justice.",39 Consequently, the due process clause is con-
cerned with the ability of non-residents to structure their conduct with mini-
mum assurance as to where that conduct will or will not subject them to suit.4°
The determination of whether a non-resident's contacts satisfy due process
depends upon the quality and nature of the defendant's activity within the forum
state.41 The Supreme Court has stated that due process is satisfied when a non-
resident's "conduct and connection with the forum State are such that he should
reasonably anticipate being haled into court there." 42 Accordingly, the due pro-
cess clause protects against a state's assertion of personal jurisdiction over a non-
resident defendant with whom the state has no meaningful "contacts, ties, or
relations."
4 3
In International Shoe, the Supreme Court provided four guidelines for de-
termining whether the contacts of a non-resident are sufficient to warrant the
exercise of personal jurisdiction over him or her: (1) a non-resident defendant is
amenable to personal jurisdiction when the activities of that defendant have been
continuous and systematic, and those activities gave rise to the cause of action
sued upon;44 (2) a non-resident defendant is not subject to personal jurisdiction
when his or her single or isolated act, or sporadic or casual activities, in the
forum are unrelated to the cause of action;45 (3) a non-resident defendant may
be amenable to personal jurisdiction when the continuous activities of that de-
fendant are substantial, and of such a nature so as to justify the suit against that
party, even if the cause of action is unrelated to those activities;4 6 and (4) a
38. Id. at 316.
39. Id; see also J. FRIEDENTHAL, M. KANE & A. MILLER, supra note 20, § 3.10, at 125.
The authors state that:
The language of the International Shoe opinion sets out the "fair play and substantial
justice" formulation as the standard against which the sufficiency of the minimum
contacts is to be measured, thus tying the two standards together. Many later deci-
sions appear to sever the standard into a two-pronged test. These decisions neither
explicitly admit that the test has been altered nor attempt to base the bifurcation
upon the text of International Shoe itself. Other cases applying the International
Shoe standard retain the unified approach more or less as it appears in [Chief Justice]
Stone's opinion. The Supreme Court, in World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, explic-
itly adopted the two-pronged approach, characterizing the minimum contacts in-
quiry as a threshold question. Only when minimum contacts are found to exist
among the parties and the forum do fair play and substantial justice become relevant
considerations.
Id § 3.10, at 125 n.9 (citation omitted).
40. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980).
41. International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319.
42. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297.
43. International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319.
44. Id. at 317, 320.
45. Id.; Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 251 (1958).
46. International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 318; Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S.
437, 446-49 (1952).
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non-resident may be subjected to the assertion of personal jurisdiction by a state
for claims arising out of single, or sporadic acts, under certain circumstances.
4 7
The Supreme Court has stated that the due process concerns are met when
a non-resident has sufficient minimum contacts with the forum state. The Court
reasoned that by exercising the privilege of conducting activities within a forum
state, thereby enjoying the benefits and the protections of the laws of that state,
48
the non-resident has obligated himself or herself to respond to a suit in that
state.4 9 Consequently, in Hanson v. Denckla,5 ° the Supreme Court added that,
in every case it is essential that there be some act by which the defendant "pur-
posefllly avail[s himself or herself] of the privilege of conducting activities
within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws."
5 1
The Court has continuously affirmed this principle that the non-resident's expec-
tations are an integral aspect of the due process analysis.5 2 In World- Wide
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson,"3 the Court stated:
When a corporation "purposefully avails itself of the privilege of con-
ducting activities within the forum State," it has clear notice that it is
subject to suit there, and can act to alleviate the risk of burdensome
litigation by procuring insurance, passing the expected costs on to cus-
tomers, or, if the risks are too great, severing its connection with the
State.
5 4
The Supreme Court, in World-Wide Volkswagen, concluded that a non-resi-
dent must have purposefully availed himself or herself of the benefits and protec-
tions of the forum state's laws either by direct acts inside the forum or by acts
outside the forum, in such a way that the defendant should have reasonably
foreseen that he or she could be required to defend a suit in that state.5 5 This
notion of foreseeability does not include the "mere likelihood that a product will
find its way into the forum State. Rather, it is that the defendant's conduct and
connection with the forum State are such that he should reasonably anticipate
being haled into court there."'5 6 This requirement of purposeful availment pro-
tects a non-resident defendant's individual liberty interests under the due pro-
cess clause by giving that party some certainty as to where that individual's
47. International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 318; McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S.
220, 223 (1957).
48. International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319.
49. Id
50. 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
51. Id at 253.
52. See, e.g., Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 109 (1987); Burger
King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462,475 (1985); World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297;
Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 97 (1978).
53. 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
54. Id at 297.
55. Id. at 297-98.
56. Id at 297.
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conduct will or will not subject him or her to suit.
5 7
Therefore, if a non-resident has sufficient minimum contacts with the forum
state, and that individual purposefully availed himself or herself of the benefits
and protections of that state's laws, the assertion of personal jurisdiction over
that non-resident will be proper so long as the exercise of jurisdiction comports
with "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice."
5 8
It has long been recognized that courts should determine whether the asser-
tion of personal jurisdiction comports with "fair play and substantial justice" by
balancing the burden placed on the defendant to defend a suit outside the state
of his or her residence5 9 against: (1) the forum state's interest in adjudicating
the dispute;6° (2) the plaintiff's interest in obtaining convenient and effective
relief,61 (3) the interstate judicial system's interest in obtaining the most efficient
resolution of controversies;62 and (4) the shared interest of the several states in
furthering fundamental substantive social policies. 63 As a result, the Supreme
Court has concluded that "[c]ompelling a non-resident defendant to submit to
suit in an inconvenient forum may be unduly burdensome, and therefore incon-
sistent with the demands of due process, even though the defendant has some
contacts with the forum state." ' 4 Jurisdiction over a non-resident will be im-
proper only if the burden on him or her is so great that it will defeat these
compelling interests.65
Therefore, if the non-resident's contacts with the forum state meet the re-
quirements of that state's long-arm statute and the exercise of personal jurisdic-
tion over the defendant comports with the due process requirements of the
United States Constitution, jurisdiction over the non-resident will be proper.
The fiduciary shield doctrine enters into this jurisdictional analysis as a lim-
itation on a court's exercise of personal jurisdiction over non-resident corporate
officials. 66 The doctrine recognizes the fundamental unfairness of subjecting
corporate officials to suit in their individual capacities for acts that were taken
solely in their corporate capacities.
67
When corporate officials conduct activities with the forum state solely in
their corporate capacities, it is the corporation that purposefully avails itself of
the benefits and privileges of the forum state's laws, not the individuals. It is
57. Insurance Corp. of I. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702 n.10
(1982).
58. International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316.
59. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292.
60. Id.
61. Id
62. Id
63. Id
64. J. FRIEDENTHAL, M. KANE & A. MILLER, supra note 20, § 3.10, at 128.
65. See Asahi Metal Indus., 480 U.S. at 114-16 (heavy burden on non-resident defendant
to defend suit in foreign country outweighed slight interests of plaintiff and forum state).
66. United States v. Montreal Trust, 358 F.2d 239, 243 (2d Cir.), cerL denied, 384 U.S.
919 (1966).
67. Marine Midland Bank v. Miller, 664 F.2d 899, 902 (2d Cir. 1981).
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clear that constitutional due process requires that jurisdiction be asserted over
non-resident defendants only if they purposefully availed themselves of these
benefits and protections.68 Personal jurisdiction, therefore, should not be exer-
cised over corporate officials who did not have contacts with the forum state in
their individual capacities, because such an exercise would be against "tradi-
tional notions of fair play and substantial justice." Consequently, the fiduciary
shield doctrine should be considered in the constitutional due process analysis in
cases involving corporate officials who are sued in their personal capacities.
However, there is an exception to this general rule. The fiduciary shield
doctrine should not be considered in the jurisdictional analysis when corporate
officials alledgedly commit intentional torts directed at residents of forum
states.6 9 In this situation, fundamental fairness mandates that forum states have
the power to exercise jurisdiction over these corporate officials. These concerns
for fairness outweigh any unfairness that may result by exercising jurisdiction
over corporate officials who have not purposefully availed themselves of the fo-
rum states' laws in their individual capacities.
III. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE FIDUCIARY SHIELD DOCTRINE
A. The Origin of the Fiduciary Shield Doctrine
The fiduciary shield doctrine evolved from a series of New York state and
federal cases decided in the late 1960s.7" The opinion usually identified as creat-
ing the fiduciary shield doctrine is Boas & Associates v. Vernier. 1 In Boas, Boas
& Associates brought an action against Vernier, a non-resident of New York, to
recover commissions that Boas & Associates had earned as a broker and consult-
68. Hanson, 357 U.S. at 253; see supra notes 48-58 and accompanying text.
69. See infra notes 163-74 and accompanying text.
70. See Wilshire Oil Co. of Texas v. Rifie, 409 F.2d 1277, 1281 n.8 (10th Cir. 1969);
United States v. Montreal Trust Co., 358 F.2d 239, 243 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 919
(1966); Willner v. Thompson, 285 F. Supp. 394, 397 (E.D.N.Y. 1968); Schenin v. Micro Cop-
per Corp., 272 F. Supp. 523, 528-29 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); Unicon Mgmt. v. Koppers Co., 250 F.
Supp. 850, 853 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); Boas & Assocs. v. Vernier, 22 A.D.2d 561, 563, 257 N.Y.S.2d
487, 490 (1965).
71. 22 A.D.2d 561, 257 N.Y.S.2d 487 (1965). But see Kreutter v. McFadden Oil Corp., 71
N.Y.2d 460, 468, 522 N.E.2d 40, 44, 527 N.Y.S.2d 195, 199-200 (1988) (court concluded that
the Boas court did not create the fiduciary shield doctrine). The Kreutter court stated:
In Boas, however, plaintiff was suing on a contract and the Appellate Division
merely found that, as a matter of substantive law, no claim could be asserted against
an individual nonresident defendant whose only contact with New York was his exe-
cution of a contract here on behalf of his corporate employer. That was so, the Boas
court noted, because one who executes a contract on behalf of a corporation without
also signing it in his individual capacity is not personally obligated under the agree-
ment. The Boas court did not address whether the defendant was amenable to juris-
diction in the New York courts and thus it provides no basis for development of the
jurisdictional doctrine the Second Circuit attributed to it.
Id. (citations omitted).
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ant under both an oral and a written agreement.72 The New York Appellate
Court found that the New York long-arm statute73 did not authorize the court
to exercise personal jurisdiction over Vernier because the cause of action did not
arise from an act of Vernier in the transaction of business within New York.74
After the court had seemingly dismissed the jurisdictional issue, it provided an-
other reason why jurisdiction over Vernier would be improper: "The writing...
was executed by defendant solely in his capacity as general manager of the cor-
poration, and not in his individual capacity.",75 This dictum formed the basis for
what is known today as the fiduciary shield doctrine.
76
Several courts have recognized Boas as having created the fiduciary shield
doctrine.7 7 The first case to identify the doctrine in the federal courts was
United States v. Montreal Trust Co.78 In Montreal Trust, the Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit, citing Boas, stated that "when one engages in activity
within New York in a fiduciary capacity, jurisdiction cannot be obtained over
him in his individual capacity. ' 79 Subsequently, the Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit, in Wilshire Oil Co. v. Rife,80 also cited Boas, stating:
[W]hile a foreign corporation is amenable to service when it transacts
business through agents operating in the forum state, unless the agents
72. Boas & Assocs., 22 A.D.2d at 562, 257 N.Y.S.2d at 489. The written contract provided
that Vernier would pay a commission to Boas & Associates for the arrangement of business
between Vernier and a party having "a base, branch or affiliate in the United States." Id. at
563, 257 N.Y.S.2d at 489-90. Because Boas & Associates sought compensation for business it
had arranged between Vernier and two French individuals, not American individuals, the writ-
ten contract did not apply to Boas & Associate's claims. Id. at 563, 257 N.Y.S.2d at 490. As a
result, the court reasoned that the negotiation and the execution of the written contract in New
York did not provide a basis for the exercise of personal jurisdiction over Vernier. Id. The
court also found that the oral agreement did not allow New York to exercise personal jurisdic-
tion over Vernier since the oral agreement was not negotiated or concluded in New York, and
Vernier did not engage in any activities in New York with respect to that agreement. Id at
563, 257 N.Y.S.2d at 489.
73. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. § 302(a)(1) (McKinney 1990). See infra note 217 for the
language of this statute.
74. Boas & Assocy., 22 A.D.2d at 563, 257 N.Y.S.2d at 489.
75. Id. at 563, 257 N.Y.S.2d at 490.
76. Wilshire Oil, 409 F.2d at 1281 n.8; Schenin, 272 F. Supp. at 528. But see Sponsler,
Jurisdiction Over the Corporate Agent: The Fiduciary Shield, 35 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 349,
353 (1978) (author suggests that the Boas court did not intend to create the fiduciary shield
doctrine, btit was merely attempting to show the defendant's lack of substantive liability on the
writen contract).
77. See Wilshire Oil, 409 F.2d at 1281 n.8; Montreal Trust, 358 F.2d at 243; Alosio v.
Iranian Shipping Lines, 307 F. Supp. 1117, 1118 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); Schenin, 272 F. Supp. at
528-29.
78. 358 F.2d 239 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 919 (1966).
79. Id. at 243. The court held, however, that the fiduciary shield doctrine would not insu-
late the defendant from jurisdiction because the defendant "could not have been acting in his
role as a corporate officer when he alledgedly directed a course of payments to his relatives and
friends." Id
80. 409 F.2d 1277 (10th Cir. 1969).
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transact business on their own account and not on behalf of the corpo-
ration, the agents are not engaged in business so as to sustain an
application of the long-arm statute to them as individuals.
81
B. The Rationale Behind the Fiduciary Shield Doctrine
Courts have given several reasons for restricting the assertion of personal
jurisdiction over corporate officials. One reason is based on fairness.8 2 Courts
have recognized that it is unfair to force individuals to defend suits in states in
which the individuals' only relevant contacts with those states are acts taken on
behalf of the corporations they represent.8 3 Because contacts undertaken by of-
ficials in their corporate capacities further only the corporations' interests, some
courts have recognized that individuals acting in their corporate capacities have
not made a voluntary choice to avail themselves of the laws of the forum state.
8 4
Consequently, when corporate officials conduct activities solely in their corpo-
rate capacities, it would be unfair to extend jurisdiction over them in their indi-
vidual capacities.8 5 The fact that such individuals could be shielded from
personal jurisdiction is not fundamentally unfair because the corporation could
still be subjected to suit in the forum, providing it has sufficient contacts with the
forum, and the corporate officials could still be called or deposed as witnesses.
Courts are also concerned that, without any limitation upon the exercise of
personal jurisdiction over corporate officials, these representatives will con-
stantly be in court defending suits directed against the acts of the corporation. 6
In Weller v. Cromwell Oil Co.,S7 the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
noted that if courts were allowed to exercise jurisdiction over corporate officials
on the basis of their corporate acts, officers and directors would be forced to
defend suits "in every state of the union whenever they make telephone calls or
81. Id. at 1281 n.8.
82. Marine Midland Bank v. Miller, 664 F.2d 899, 902 (2d Cir. 1981).
83. Id.; Grove Press v. CIA, 483 F. Supp. 132, 135-36 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Merkel Assocs. v.
Bellofram Corp., 437 F. Supp. 612, 618 (W.D.N.Y. 1977).
84. See, eg., Zeman v. Lotus Heart, Inc., 717 F. Supp. 373, 375 (D. Md. 1989). The
Zeman court stated:
The fiduciary shield doctrine protects an individual who acts in the forum state solely
as the representative of the corporation from suit in that state because he does not
personally avail himself of the laws and protection of the forum state in any meaning-
ful way. He is there exclusively in furtherance of the interests of his employer.
1d
85. See infra notes 104-25 and accompanying text.
86. Weller v. Cromwell Oil Co., 504 F.2d 927, 931 (6th Cir. 1974); Warren v. Dynamics
Health Equip. Mfg., 483 F. Supp. 788, 793 (M.D. Tenn. 1980). The Warren court noted:
If the employee has no direct contacts with the foreign state it may be unreasonable,
given only his relationship to the corporation that may have such contacts, to con-
clude that he would be subject to the personal jurisdiction of the court. Otherwise
every employee of a corporation would be subject to the personal jurisdiction of the
courts in every state where the corporation is doing business.
87. 504 F.2d 927 (6th Cir. 1974).
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write letters.. .. ,,81
A final reason to shield corporate officials from assertions of personal juris-
diction is out of respect for the nature of the corporate form. Although a corpo-
ration can only act through its representatives, it is well established that the
rights and duties of the corporate organization are separate and distinct from the
rights and duties of its representatives.8 9 Courts have continuously respected
and enforced these separate rights and duties.' ° In Sun-Herald Corp. v. Dug-
gan,9' Judge Learned Hand warned:
The law of corporations allows the fabrication of such elaborately invo-
luted jural persons... and out of them authentic rights and duties will
emerge. Although there are occasions when courts will brush them
aside, and decide controversies as though only the human actors had
been concerned, when there is no such occasion, the rights and duties
that result must be respected and enforced like any others.
92
C. The Legal Basis of the Fiduciary Shield Doctrine
Courts and scholars have disagreed on the issue whether the fiduciary
shield doctrine is a component of a state's long-arm statute, or whether it is an
element of constitutional due process.93 The New York Appellate Court, in
Boas & Associates v. Vernier,94 did not articulate whether the fiduciary shield
doctrine was based on statutory or constitutional law. 95 The court merely
88. Id. at 931.
89. United States v. Montreal Trust Co., 358 F.2d 239, 253-54 (2d Cir.) (Timbers, .,
concurring in part and dissenting in part), cert denied, 384 U.S. 919 (1966); Rashap v. Brown-
ell, 229 F.2d 193, 195 (2d Cir. 1956); Sun-Herald Corp. v. Duggan, 160 F.2d 475, 478 (2d Cir.
1947).
90. See, eg., Forsythe v. Overmyer, 576 F.2d 779, 783 (9th Cir. 1978) ("courts generally
respect corporate boundaries in jurisdictional contexts"); Montreal Trust, 358 F.2d at 253
("This Court has never lightly brushed aside corporate identities which are carefully pre-
served, but traditionally has respected and enforced the rights and duties resulting from corpo-
rate organization."); Kula v. J.K. Schofield & Co., 668 F. Supp. 1126, 1129 (N.D. Ill. 1987)
(corporate officers, directors and shareholders are "separate and distinct" from the corpora-
tion); Opal Mercantile v. Tamblyn, 616 P.2d 776, 778 (Wyo. 1980) ("Ordinarily, a corporation
is a separate entity distinct from that of individuals comprising it.").
91. 160 F.2d 475 (2d Cir. 1947).
92. Id. at 478.
93. See e.g., Columbia Briargate Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 713 F.2d 1052, 1059 (4th Cir.),
cert denied sub nor. Pearson v. Columbia Briargate Co., 465 U.S. 1007 (1984); Note, The
Fiduciary Shield Doctrine: A Rule of Statutory Construction or a Constitutional Principle?, 1984
J. Corn'. L. 901, 909-12.
94. 22 A.D.2d 561, 257 N.Y.S.2d 487 (1965).
95. See id. at 563, 257 N.Y.S.2d at 490. Some courts have held that the Boas court applied
the fiduciary shield doctrine as a statutory principle because the doctrine was invoked when
the court analyzed the construction of New York's long-arm statute. See, e.g., Marine Mid-
land Bank v. Miller, 664 F.2d 899, 902 n.3 (2d Cir. 1981); United States v. Montreal Trust Co.,
358 F.2d 239, 242 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 919 (1966). In reaching this conclusion, the
Montreal Trust court explained that the issue of whether jurisdiction could be asserted over an
individual defendant, based on acts taken in his corporate capacity, did not involve the broad
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announced the concept and did not provide any critical discussion of the doc-
trine.9 6 Since Boas was decided, courts have disagreed as to the legal basis of the
doctrine.9 7 The United States Supreme Court had an opportunity to rule on this
issue in Calder v. Jones,98 but the Court's treatment of the doctrine was very
confusing,99 and, as a result, subsequent courts have continued to have difficulty
in determining the legal basis of the doctrine.
Many courts have concluded, without offering any analysis, that the fiduci-
ary shield doctrine is an element of the statutory analysis.l0 However, there are
no United States Supreme Court decisions that support this result, nor are there
any plausible reasons for concluding as such.10 1 On the other hand, many
courts have concluded that the fiduciary shield doctrine is a component of con-
stitutional due process."0 2 This is logical in light of the principles established by
the Supreme Court for determining whether the assertion of jurisdiction over a
non-resident comports with the due process clause of the United States Constitu-
tion. 0 3 The following analysis describes the reasons why consideration of the
fiduciary shield doctrine is essential in satisfying the requirements of due
process.
As noted previously, the due process clause has as its underpinnings a de-
sire to achieve "'fair play and substantial justice'" in the exercise of personal
jurisdiction over non-residents.1 04 Additionally, due process requires that non-
residents have" 'fair warning that a particular activity may subject [them] to the
question of constitutional interpretation-whether personal jurisdiction over the defendant
would be appropriate under the due process clause of the United States Constitution. Rather,
the issue concerned the narrow question of statutory interpretation-whether the defendant,
within the meaning of New York's long-arm statute, transacted business in New York. Mon-
treal Trust, 358 F.2d at 242.
96. Boas & Assocs, 22 A.D.2d at 563, 257 N.Y.S.2d at 490.
97. See supra notes 100-03 and accompanying text.
98. 465 U.S. 783 (1984).
99. See infra notes 144-74 and accompanying text.
100. Marine Midland Bank, 664 F.2d at 902 n.3; Montreal Trust, 358 F.2d at 242.
If the doctrine is found to be grounded in statutory law, and not grounded in due process,
the doctrine could not be applied in an action brought under a state long-arm statute that
extends jurisdiction to the outermost limits of due process. Columbia Briargate, 713 F.2d at
1057. However, the doctrine could be applied in an action brought under a state long.arm
statute that does not extend jurisdiction to the outermost limits of due process. Byer v. Gordos
Ark., Inc., 712 F. Supp. 149, 155 (W.D. Ark. 1989); Chicago Blower Corp. v. Air Sys. Assocs.,
623 F. Supp. 798, 804 (E.D. Mich. 1985); Nordic Bank PLC v. Trend Group, 619 F. Supp.
542, 569 n.30 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
101. Columbia Briargate Co., 713 F.2d at 1058.
102. See Lehigh Valley Indus. v. Birenbaum, 527 F.2d 87, 92-93 (2d Cir. 1975); Weller v.
Cromwell Oil Co., 504 F.2d 927, 929 (6th Cir. 1974); Bulova Watch Co. v. K. Hattori & Co.,
508 F. Supp. 1322, 1347-48 (E.D.N.Y. 1981); Idaho Potato Comm'n v. Washington Potato
Comm'n, 410 F. Supp. 171, 182-83 (D. Idaho 1976); State ax rel Miller v. Internal Energy
Mgmt., 324 N.W.2d 707, 711 (Iowa 1982).
103. See supra notes 35-65 and accompanying text.
104. International Shoe Co. v. Woodson, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (quoting Milliken v.
Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
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jurisdiction of a foreign sovereign.! ,105
In order for a court to assert jurisdiction over non-residents, those individu-
als must have sufficient minimum contacts with the forum state, ° 6 and they
must have purposefully availed themselves of the benefits and protections of the
laws of that state.10 7 In addition, the assertion of jurisdiction must comport
with "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice."10 8
When non-resident corporate officials act solely in their corporate capaci-
ties, it cannot be credibly maintained that they purposefully availed themselves
of the benefits and protections of the forum states' laws. 1° 9 It is the corpora-
tions, not the individuals, that have purposefully availed themselves. The
United States Supreme Court has established that it would violate due process to
extend personal jurisdiction over parties who have not purposefully availed
themselves of the laws of the forum states.1 1° Indeed, in World-Wide Volks-
wagen Corp. v. Woodson, 11 the Supreme Court stated that one of the purposes
in requiring purposeful availment is to give "clear notice" to non-residents that
they could be subjected to suit in those states.112 Without purposeful availment,
the Court added, individuals cannot act to "alleviate the risk of burdensome
litigation."' 13 Under these circumstances, it would be against "traditional no-
tions of fair play and substantial justice" to extend personal jurisdiction over
individuals when the constitutional requirement of purposeful availment is
lacking.
Some may argue that even if there is no purposeful availment, the fact that
corporate officials could foresee the injurious results of their actions is enough to
extend personal jurisdiction over them. The United States Supreme Court, how-
ever, has held that merely foreseeing that activities would cause injuries in other
states is not a sufficient basis upon which to justify the assertion of personal
105. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 (1985) (quoting Shaffer v. Heit-
ner, 433 U.S. 186, 218 (1977) (Stevens, J., concurring)).
106. International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316.
107. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958). In Burger King, the Supreme Court
stated:
A State generally has a "manifest interest" in providing its residents with a conve-
nient forum for redressing injuries inflicted by out-of-state actors. Moreover, where
individuals "purposefully derive benefit" from their interstate activities, it may well
be unfair to allow them to escape having to account in other States for consequences
that arise proximately from such activities; the Due Process Clause may not readily
be wielded as a territorial shield to avoid interstate obligations that have been volun-
tarily assumed. And because "modern transportation and communications have
made it much less burdensome for a party sued to defend himself in a State where he
engages in economic activity," it usually will not be unfair to subject him to the
burdens of litigating in another forum for disputes relating to such activity.
Burger King, 471 U.S. at 473-74 (citations omitted).
108. International Shoe, 310 U.S. at 316.
109. Idaho Potato Comm'n, 410 F. Supp. at 182-83.
110. Hanson, 357 U.S. at 253.
111. 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
112. Id. at 297.
113. Id.
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jurisdiction. 114 Rather, "the foreseeability that is critical to due process analysis
... is that the defendant[s'] conduct and connection with the forum State are
such that [they] should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there." '115
When corporate officials conduct activities in a state on behalf of the corpora-
tions that employ them, the corporations would reasonably anticipate that they
would be called to respond to suits there. On the other hand, the individual
corporate officials would not reasonably anticipate that they would be subjected
to that state's jurisdiction since all of their activities were taken for the benefit of
the corporation.
This line of reasoning was advanced by the court in Idaho Potato Commis-
sion v. Washington Potato Commission. 116 In that case, members of the Wash-
ington Potato Commission approved an advertising plan that was distributed in
the state of Idaho. 7 Plaintiff, Idaho Potato Commission, alleged that the plan
infringed its trademark."1 The court granted the Washington Potato Commis-
sion members' motion to dismiss on the basis that exercising jurisdiction over
the members would be against due process. 19 In reaching its conclusion, the
court reasoned that the members did not purposefully avail themselves of the
benefits and privileges of Idaho's laws. 20 The court explained:
[A] corporate employee... by performing corporate business, causes
the corporation to purposefully avail itself of the laws of another state.
Absent a ruse to conceal an employee's personal activity behind the
corporate shield, it is most difficult to conclude that the employee pur-
posefully availed himself of a distant forum's laws.1
2 1
Under these circumstances, the court stated that it was doubtful that the
114. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 474.
115. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297.
116. 410 F. Supp. 171 (D. Idaho 1975).
117. Id. at 182. The court stated that the members' positions on the Commission was
"closely analogous to the relationship of officers and directors of a corporation," and therefore
the issue of jurisdiction over the members was determined as though the members were officers
and directors of a corporation. Id. at 180.
118. Id at 182.
119. Id at 183.
120. Id at 182-83. The court also found that the nexus between the Washington Potato
Commission members and the forum state of Idaho is "tenuous." Id. at 182. Although the
activity of the members had an alleged effect in Idaho, the members were never physically
present in Idaho. Id. The court stated that the facts of this case were different from the facts
of the following hypothetical where the nexus between the defendant and the forum is not
tenuous:
If Corporation A from State X sends Employee B into State Y to deliver certain
products, and B crashes his delivery truck, injuring Resident C in State Y, then juris-
diction over both A and B exists in State Y. The result flows from the commission of
a tortious act within the purview of State Y's long-arm statute.
Id. The court stated that it is one thing to hold that a corporation that conducts activities
outside the forum that have effects inside the forum is subject to the personal jurisdiction of the
forum, but it is quite different to hold that an individual working for that corporation, who has
never been physically present in the forum, is subject to the jurisdiction of the forum. Id.
121. Id. at 182-83 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
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individual members would have reasonably anticipated that their activities
would subject them to personal jurisdiction in Idaho.
122
The court concluded by noting that the Idaho Potato Commission's inter-
ests of exercising jurisdiction over the members, and the state of Idaho's inter-
ests extending its jurisdiction to the fullest extent permitted by the due process
clause, would not be seriously harmed since the court had jurisdiction over the
corporation that committed the acts within the state.123 Consequently, the
court held that exercising personal jurisdiction over the members of the Wash-
ington Potato Commission "would be against 'fair play' and 'substantialjustice'
and is therefore unconstitutional." 124
Since corporate officials who conduct activities solely in their corporate ca-
pacities do not purposefully avail themselves of the benefits and privileges of the
forum state's laws, these individuals should not be subjected to personal jurisdic-
tion in their individual capacities according to the jurisdictional principles of the
United States Constitution. It would be against "fair play and substantial jus-
tice" to hold that these non-residents are amenable to the jurisdiction of forum
courts when these individuals did not purposefully establish minimum contacts
with those states. 125 Since the fiduciary shield doctrine promotes the principles
underlying the constitutional jurisdictional analysis, the doctrine is properly
characterized as an element of constitutional due process.
IV. CALDER V JONES
A. The Facts
In Calder v. Jones,126 actress Shirley Jones and her husband, Marty Engels,
brought an action in California Superior Court, for libel against the National
Enquirer, a national weekly newspaper publication. 12 7 In the same action, the
couple also named as defendants the newspaper's local distributing company, its
editor, Iain Calder, and reporter, John South.'2 8 The action arose out of an
article written by South that alleged that Jones drank so heavily that it pre-
vented her from fulfilling her professional obligations as an entertainer. 129 Jones
claimed that, as a result of the article, she suffered emotional distress and injury
to her professional reputation in California.
130
The National Enquirer is a Florida corporation that transacts business in
122. Id. at 182.
123. IM at 183.
124. Id
125. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 476; see also Bulova Watch, 508 F. Supp. at 1348 ("Where
the corporate agent engages in corporate business for the sole benefit of the corporation, it is
difficult to see how the exercise of jurisdiction over one who has conducted no activities on his
own behalf 'comports with fair play and substantial justice.' ").
126. 465 U.S. 783 (1984).
127. Id at 784-85.
128. Id
129. Id at 788 n.9.
130. Id. at 788-89.
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California, and distributes over five million copies nationwide on a weekly ba-
sis.13 1 California receives more newspapers than any other state.
132
At the time suit was brought, the individual non-resident defendants, Cal-
der and South, resided in Florida. 13 3 They moved to quash the service of the
summons on the ground that the court lacked personal jurisdiction over them
since they did not have sufficient "contacts" with the state of California.
134
Calder was president and editor of the National Enquirer and he supervised
nearly every function of the publication. 135 He travelled to California, however,
on only two occasions; once for pleasure, and once to testify at a trial in an
unrelated matter.136 His involvement with the alledgedly "libelous" article con-
sisted of reviewing and approving the subject of the article, and editing the final
version. 37
South was the author of the article.1 3 ' He made frequent visits to Califor-
nia for business purposes.1 39 He also made numerous telephone calls to Califor-
nia in conjunction with the Jones article, including one call to plaintiff Engels to
obtain his comments on the article before publication and several calls to a
source in California who provided him with information. 14° South did most of
his research in Florida, but relied on the source in California for additional
information. 
14 1
The California Superior Court granted the motion by Calder and South to
quash the service of the summons for lack of personal jurisdiction,142 and the
California Court of Appeal reversed on the basis that Calder's and South's
131. Id. at 785.
132. Id.
133. Jones v. Calder, 138 Cal. App. 3d 128, 130, 187 Cal. Rptr. 825, 827 (1982), aff'd, 465
U.S. 783 (1984).
134. Id. The defendant, National Enquirer, did not contest the court's exercise ofjurisdic-
tion over it. Id at 130 n.3, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 827 n.3.
135. Calder, 465 U.S. at 786.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 785.
139. Id.
140. Id at 785-86.
141. Id.
142. Jones, 138 Cal. App. 3d at 131, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 827. The California Superior Court
stated that the actions of Calder and South were sufficient to assert personal jurisdiction under
California's long-arm statute because their actions in Florida caused injury to the plaintiffs in
California. Calder, 465 U.S. at 786 & n.5. The superior court, however, declined to exercise
jurisdiction over them for constitutional policy reasons. Id. at 786.
The superior court stated that Calder and South were entitled to "special solicitude...
because of the potential 'chilling effect' on reporters and editors which would result from re-
quiring them to appear in remote jurisdictions to answer for the content of articles upon which
they worked." Calder, 465 U.S. at 786. The superior court claimed that in defamation ac-
tiojns, where freedom of the press is involved, "First Amendment considerations should be
weighed in the balance of fundamental fairness in resolving whether a state can compel a
nonresident defendant to appear and defend an action." Jones, 138 Cal. App. 3d at 131, 187
Cal. Rptr. at 827. The superior court justified this immunization from personal jurisdiction on
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actions were intended to cause, and did cause tortious injury to Jones and Engels
in California.1 43
B. The United States Supreme Court's Decision
The United States Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the California
Court of Appeal and held that jurisdiction was proper under the United States
Constitution, 144 and therefore, under the California long-arm statute as well.145
Calder and South claimed they should not be subjected to California's juris-
diction since their employer was solely responsible for the circulation of the arti-
cle in California. 1" They argued that they had no control over the circulation
nor the marketing activities of the corporation, and as a reporter and editor,
they had no direct economic stake in the corporation's sales.147 They reasoned
that merely foreseeing that the article could have an effect in California was not
a sufficient basis upon which the Court could assert personal jurisdiction.
14 8
Calder and South analogized themselves to a welder, employed in Florida,
who worked on a boiler that subsequently exploded in California. 49 While ju-
risdiction would be proper over the manufacturing corporation under these cir-
cumstances, Calder and South reasoned that jurisdiction would not be proper if
exercised over the welder, since he had no control over, nor derived any eco-
nomic benefit from the corporation's sales in California.15 ° Calder and South
argued that they, like the hypothetical welder, had no control over the corpora-
tion's activities. 151 Therefore, they asserted that California did not have juris-
diction over them.
1 52
The Supreme Court responded by stating that the "analogy doesn't wash,"
because the actions of Calder and South were significantly different from the
hypothetical welder's actions.15 3 While the welder would have been charged
the ground that Jones' and Engels' rights could be "fully satisfied" in their suit against the
corporation without requiring Calder and South to appear as parties. Calder, 465 U.S. at 786.
143. Jones, 138 Cal. App. 3d at 137, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 832. The California Court of Appeal
held that California could exercise personal jurisdiction over Calder and South. Id. The court
of appeal held that the assertion of personal jurisdiction over them was proper because their
actions, although conducted in Florida, were intended to cause and did cause tortious injury to
Jones and Engels in California. Id. at 135, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 830. The court of appeal rejected
the superior court's theory that first amendment considerations could operate to immunize
reporters and editors from jurisdiction in defamation actions. Id at 132, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 828.
144. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
145. Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 791 (1984); see CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 410.10 (West
1973 & Supp. 1990). See infra note 176 for the text of this statute.
146. Calder, 465 U.S. at 789.
147. Id
148. IM
149. Id
150. Id
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. I1d at 789-90.
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with "mere untargeted negligence," 154 Calder and South were charged with "in-
tentional, and alledgedly tortious" actions expressly aimed at a resident of Cali-
fornia. 5 Furthermore, Calder and South knew that the article South wrote
and Calder edited could potentially have a devastating impact upon Jones, and
the brunt of any harm would be felt by her in California.1 16 As a result, the
Supreme Court held that jurisdiction over Calder and South was proper since
they could have "reasonably anticipate[d] being haled" into California to re-
spond to the allegations made by Jones.
157
The Court rejected the argument by Calder and South that they should be
immunized from jurisdiction since their actions were taken solely on behalf of
the corporation.15 8 The Court stated Calder and South were correct in arguing
that their contacts with California should not be analyzed according to the activ-
ities of their employer.15 9 The Court noted, however, that "their status as em-
ployees [did] not somehow insulate them from jurisdiction. Each defendant's
contacts with the forum State must be assessed individually." l° The Court
found that jurisdiction over Calder and South was proper based on their al-
ledgedly intentional wrongdoing, the harm of which was felt in the state of Cali-
fornia.1 61 The Court concluded that Calder and South were not entitled to
immunity from jurisdiction based upon the fiduciary shield doctrine because
they were "primary participants in an alleged wrongdoing intentionally directed
at a California resident .... 
162
V. RECONCILING THE AFrERMATH OF CALDER V JONES
A. The Analysis of the United States Supreme Court's Decision
in Calder v. Jones
The United States Supreme Court acknowledged the fiduciary shield doc-
trine in Calder v. Jones,1 63 without addressing it by name, when it stated
"[petitioners are correct that their contacts with California are not to be judged
according to their employer's activities there." 164 Likewise, in a subsequent
154. Id. at 789.
155. Id
156. Id. at 789-90.
157. Id at 790. The Supreme Court rejected the claims by Calder and South that they
should be protected from jurisdiction on the basis of first amendment concerns. Id. at 790-91.
In dismissing this theory, the Supreme Court reasoned that the potential "chilling effect" on
reporters and editors is considered in the substantive law governing libel and defamation ac-
tions and therefore, there is no need to add special procedural protections. Id.
158. See id.
159. Id.
160. Id (citing Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320, 332 (1980) ('"he requirements of Interna-
tional Shoe ...must be met as to each defendant over whom a state court exercises
jurisdiction.")).
161. Id
162. Id
163. 465 U.S. 783 (1984).
164. Id at 790.
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discussion of Calder, in Keeton v. Hustler Magazine,165 the Court stated that
"jurisdiction over an employee does not automatically follow from jurisdiction
over the corporation which employs him ....
Nevertheless, the Court rejected the argument by Calder and South that
they should be shielded from jurisdiction because they had acted solely in their
orporate capacities. 167 The Court reasoned that since Calder and South were
"primary participants" in "intentional, and alledgedly tortious" actions directed
at a resident of the forum state, they should not be shielded from jurisdiction.
168
The Court stated "their status as employees [did] not somehow insulate them
from jurisdiction."
' 169
The Court also suggested, however, that if Calder and South had been
charged with "mere untargeted negligence," such as the hypothetical welder
who resides outside the forum and works on a boiler that explodes inside the
forum, they would not have been subjected to the exercise of personal jurisdic-
tion.1 70 The Court, therefore, indicated that corporate officials who commit in-
tentional torts should be treated differently than corporate officials who commit
negligent acts. As a result, Calder should be interpreted as holding that the
fiduciary shield doctrine cannot be applied to shield corporate officials from ju-
risdiction when those officials are charged with committing intentional torts, but
it can be applied when those officials are charged with committing mere
negligence.
This interpretation of Calder is consistent with the position described
above, that the fiduciary shield doctrine is an element of constitutional due
165. 465 U.S. 770 (1984).
166. Id. at 781 n.13. In Keeton, the plaintiff brought an action for libel against Hustler
Magazine, Inc. and other individual defendants. Id. at 772. The Court of Appeals for the
First Circuit concluded that since jurisdiction could not be exercised over the corporation, it
would not inquire into the propriety of jurisdiction over the individual defendants. Id. at 781
n.13. The Supreme Court reversed the decision by the court of appeals and concluded that
jurisdiction was proper over the corporation. Id. at 781. As a result, the Supreme Court
found that the issue of jurisdiction over the individual defendants would be open upon remand.
Id. at 781 n.13.
Although the Supreme Court did not consider the issue of whether jurisdiction over the
individual defendants would be proper, it did set out the relevant issues in a footnote. Id at
782 n.13. The court stated that:
It does not of course follow from the fact that jurisdiction may be asserted over
Hustler Magazine, Inc., that jurisdiction may also be asserted over either of the other
defendants. In Calder v. Jones, we today reject the suggestion that employees who
act in their official capacity are somehow shielded from suit in their individual capac-
ity. But jurisdiction over an employee does not automatically follow from jurisdic-
tion over the corporation which employs him .... Each defendant's contacts with
the forum State must be assessed individually ....
Id (citations omitted).
167. Calder, 465 U.S. at 789-90.
168. Id
169. Id at 790.
170. Id at 789.
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process. 17 1 As an element of due process, the doctrine seeks to achieve fairness
in the assertion of personal jurisdiction over corporate officials.172 The fiduciary
shield doctrine recognizes that, as a general rule, corporate officials should not
be subjected to personal jurisdiction for acts they had conducted solely in their
corporate capacities because these individuals had not purposefully availed
themselves of the forum state's laws in their individual capacities.
173
For reasons of fairness, however, this doctrine should not be applied when
corporate officials commit intentional torts. The overall concerns for fairness
that are identified in constitutional due process mandate that courts have the
authority to exercise jurisdiction over corporate officials who commit intentional
torts. Although this argument was not discussed in Calder, it is reasonable to
conclude that the overall concerns for fairness in the jurisdictional analysis out-
weigh any unfairness that may result by exercising jurisdiction over corporate
officials who lack the requisite purposeful availment in their individual capaci-
ties. It is, therefore, consistent with "'traditional notions of fair play and sub-
stantial justice' ,174 to exercise personal jurisdiction over corporate officials who
commit intentional torts. On the other hand, the doctrine should be applied to
shield corporate officials from jurisdiction when they are charged with acts other
than intentional torts, since the unfairness associated with exercising jurisdiction
over officials who lack purposeful availment is not outweighed by this overall
concern for fairness.
The fiduciary shield doctrine, therefore, has survived the Supreme Court's
decision in Calder. Calder should be interpreted as holding that the doctrine
can be invoked by courts to shield corporate officials from the exercise of juris-
diction when those officials engage in acts other than intentional torts in their
corporate capacities, but it should not be applied when those officials engage in
intentional torts. Since the doctrine seeks to ensure fundamental fairness in the
exercise of jurisdiction over corporate officials, it should be considered as an
element of constitutional due process.
B. The Effect of Calder v. Jones on the Fiduciary Shield Doctrine
The United States Supreme Court's discussion of the fiduciary shield doc-
trine in Calder v. Jones 175 has caused considerable confusion among the lower
courts. It is interesting to look at the lower court cases to see how the states
have treated the doctrine since the Supreme Court decided Calder. The follow-
ing is a survey of the states that have ruled on the fiduciary shield doctrine since
Calder. This section begins with an examination of the law in California and
171. See supra notes 93-125 and accompanying text.
172. Id
173. Idaho Potato Comm'n v. Washington Potato Comm'n, 410 F. Supp. 171, 182-83 (D.
Idaho 1976).
174. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (quoting Milliken v.
Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
175. 465 U.S. 783, 790 (1984).
[Vol. 24:809
FIDUCIARY SHIELD DOCTRINE
New York, and ends with a discussion of the law in other states that have con-
sidered the doctrine.
1. The effect of Calder v. Jones on California law
a. California's long-arm statute
The California long-arm statute, section 410.10 of the California Civil Pro-
cedure Code, 17 6 extends jurisdiction over non-resident defendants to the outer-
most limits of the due process clause of the United States Constitution.
77
Section 410.10 states, "A court of this state may exercise jurisdiction on any
'basis not inconsistent with the Constitution of this state or of the United
States."
178
b. the law in California prior to Calder v. Jones
Prior to Calder, California courts adopted the fiduciary shield doctrine as a
restriction on the exercise of personal jurisdiction over non-resident corporate
officials. 1 79 In Arnesen v. Raymond Lee Organization,180 the California Court of
Appeal rejected the assertion of jurisdiction over corporate officials who al-
ledgedly engaged in intentionally tortious conduct. 18 1 Unfortunately, none of
these courts provided a detailed analysis of the legal basis of the doctrine.
176. CAL. Civ. PRoc. CODE § 410.10 (West 1973 & Supp. 1990). Section 410.10 reads:
"Basis. A court of this state may exercise jurisdiction on any basis not inconsistent with the
Constitution of this state or of the United States." Id.
177. Data Disc, Inc. v. Systems Technology Assocs., 557 F.2d 1280, 1286 (9th Cir. 1977).
178. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 410.10.
179. See, eg., Ruger v. Superior Court, 118 Cal. App. 3d 427,431, 173 Cal. Rptr. 302, 304-
05 (1981); Shearer v. Superior Court, 70 Cal. App. 3d 424,430, 138 Cal. Rptr. 824, 828 (1977);
Arnesen v. Raymond Lee Org., 31 Cal. App. 3d 991, 995-96, 107 Cal. Rptr. 744, 747 (1973);
see also Forsythe v. Overmeyer, 576 F.2d 779, 783-84 (9th Cir.), cert denied, 439 U.S. 864
(1978) (applying California law, court did not shield the defendant from jurisdiction, but
stated "a corporate officer who has contact with a forum only with regard to the performance
of his official duties is not subject to personal jurisdiction in that forum").
180. 31 Cal. App. 3d 991, 107 Cal. Rptr. 744 (1973).
181. Id. at 996-97, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 747-48. In Arnesen, the plaintiff alleged that the con-
tracts he had entered into with the defendant corporation were illegal and were predicated on
the misrepresentations of the individual defendants, who were officers and employees of the
corporation. Id. at 993, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 745. The California Court of Appeal found that
"[t]he regular, continuous, and substantial conduct by a foreign corporation of business within
a state subjects that corporation to the personal jurisdiction of the state's courts," but it does
not subject corporate officials to jurisdiction when they act solely within their corporate capac-
ity. Id. at 995, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 747 (emphasis added). The court concluded that because
none of the corporate officials had business of their own in the forum state, California could
not exercise personal jurisdiction over them on the basis that they were "doing business"
within the state. Id at 996, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 747. Consequently, the court shielded the corpo-
rate officials from jurisdiction even though they were charged with committing intentional
misrepresentations in the forum state. Id at 998, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 748.
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c. the law in California after Calder v. Jones
Approximately one year after the Calder decision, the California Court of
Appeal reaffirmed the fiduciary shield doctrine in Mihlon v. Superior Court.182
In Mihlon, the court considered the question of whether counsel for corpora-
tions are entitled to a fiduciary shield.1 83 The court found that, unlike corporate
officers and directors, corporate counsel are not entitled to an "official capacity"
shield from personal jurisdiction.
1
8
Corporate officers and directors, the court reasoned, are shielded from juris-
diction in states where they do not reside or have minimum contacts because
corporations, by their very nature, are "separate legal entities that cannot speak
or act without their designated officers and directors."' 185 As a result, the,
Mihion court found that acts performed by corporate officials in their official
capacities may not be attributed to them as individual acts in establishing per-
sonal jurisdiction. 186 On the other hand, corporate counsel do not "speak for"
or "act for" corporations in the same way, 187 since an attorney representing a
corporation merely provides legal counsel and services.188 Consequently, the
Mihlon court concluded that the rationale behind providing corporate officials
with a shield to personal jurisdiction did not extend to corporate counsel. 189
Without any reference to Calder, the Mihion court stated, in dictum, that "it is
well established by California case law that for jurisdictional purposes the acts of
corporate officers and directors, in their official capacities, are acts exclusively of
... the corporation, and are thus not material for purposes of establishing mini-
mum contacts as to individuals." 190
Several years later, in Taylor-Rush v. Multitech Corp., 19 the California
Court of Appeal criticized Mihlon for failing to address the United States
Supreme Court's discussions, in Calder and Keeton v. Hustler Magazine,192 of
the fiduciary shield doctrine.' 9 3 In Taylor-Rush, the court held that the fiduci-
ary shield doctrine did not immunize defendants, Messinger and Carow, corpo-
rate officers and directors, from personal jurisdiction since they perpetrated a
fraud aimed at a resident of California.
1 94
Messinger and Carow "allegedly knowingly and intentionally misrepre-
sented facts" that induced the plaintiff, Taylor-Rush, to execute agreements and
182. 169 Cal. App. 3d 703, 713, 215 Cal. Rptr. 442, 447 (1985).
183. Id at 712-13, 215 Cal. Rptr. at 447.
184. Id. at 715, 215 Cal. Rptr. at 449.
185. Id. at 713, 215 Cal. Rptr. at 447.
186. Id.
187. Id at 715-16, 215 Cal. Rptr. at 449.
188. Id
189. Id.
190. Id. at 713, 215 Cal. Rptr. at 447.
191. 217 Cal. App. 3d 103, 265 Cal. Rptr. 672 (1990).
192. 465 U.S. 770 (1984).
193. Taylor-Rush, 217 Cal. App. 3d at 117, 265 Cal. Rptr. at 680.
194. Id at 118, 265 Cal. Rptr. at 680.
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transfer securities in California.19 5 The court stated that "[tihe essence of Cal-
der is that intentional tortfeasors should be prepared to defend themselves in any
jurisdiction where they direct their alleged tortious activity. Like the defendants
in Calder, Messinger and Carow 'are primary participants in an alleged wrong-
doing intentionally directed at a California resident .... ' ,,196 Moreover, the
Taylor-Rush court noted that an anomalous situation would result if corporate
officers, acting in their corporate capacity, could be shielded from jurisdiction
for the commission of a tort for which they would be personally liable, when
they could not use the same shield as a defense to substantive liability. 97 The
court stated, "Whatever the purpose and function of the fiduciary shield doc-
trine, California's long-arm statute expresses no intent to barricade transient
tortfeasors from liability for their fraudulent conduct, and jurisdiction must be
determined on the individual facts."' 19 Therefore, the California Court of Ap-
peal, in accordance with Calder, rejected the idea that an intentional tortfeasor
could be immunized from personal jurisdiction based on the fiduciary shield
doctrine.
199
In Seagate Technology v. A.J. Kogyo Co. ,2° the California Court of Appeal
held that when a corporate official commits an act for which he or she could be
personally liable, the act may be imputed to the individual for purposes of estab-
lishing personal jurisdiction, and the fiduciary shield doctrine could not be ap-
plied to defeat that exercise ofjurisdiction. 2°" In Seagate Technology, defendant
Nakata, the president and major shareholder of the corporation, was charged
with tortiously misrepresenting that the corporation would make good on a
guarantee to the plaintiff, Seagate. 20 2 Nakata personally caused the corporation
to issue the guarantee.2 "3 The court found that the actions by Nakata could
subject him to personal liability" since it was settled under California law that
195. Id. at 117, 265 Cal. Rptr. at 680.
196. Id. at 118, 265 Cal. Rptr. at 680 (quoting Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 790 (1984)).
197. Id.
198. Id. at 117, 265 Cal. Rptr. at 680 (citation omitted).
199. Id. at 117-18, 265 Cal. Rptr. at 680.
200. 219 Cal. App. 3d 696, 268 Cal. Rptr. 586 (1990).
201. Id. at 703, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 590. In Seagate Technology, the court stated:
Our conclusion that the fiduciary shield doctrine should not be applied to defeat
jurisdiction is supported by the recent decision in Taylor-Rush v. Multitech Corp..
There the court noted that the fiduciary shield doctrine is inconsistent with the legis-
lative intent behind California's long-arm statute which is designed to provide per-
sonal jurisdiction to the fullest extent constitutionally permissible.
Id (citation omitted). It does not appear, however, that the Seagate Technology court in-
tended to completely reject the fiduciary shield doctrine in California by this language.
Rather, the court only rejected the application of the doctrine when a corporate official en-
gages in an activity for which he or she could be personally liable. Id at 703-04, 268 Cal.
Rptr. at 590.
202. Id. at 705 n.2, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 591 n.2.
203. Id at 702, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 589.
204. Id at 704-05, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 591.
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corporate officers and directors were liable for their own tortious conduct.2 °5
The court also held that the acts taken by Nakata in his corporate capacity
would be considered to be acts of his own for purposes of jurisdiction on the
theory that "if a corporate officer may be held personally responsible for causing
the corporation to act, that act may be imputed to the officer for purposes of
establishing personal jurisdiction over him.' ' 2° 6 Thus, the court stated that if a
corporate official conducts an act for which the official would be personally lia-
ble, and if the act creates "contact between the officer and the forum state," then
the act may be considered in determining whether the state has jurisdiction over
the individual.20 7 Under these circumstances, the court held that the fiduciary
shield doctrine could not be applied to defeat jurisdiction over the corporate
official. 20 8 As a result, jurisdiction over Nakata was proper since he committed
an intentional act for which he could be personally liable and that act caused a
tortious "effect" in California.2
The Seagate Technology court effectively precluded the application of the
fiduciary shield doctrine to defeat jurisdiction over corporate officials when those
officials engage in activities for which they could be personally liable.2 10 Under
California law, corporate officers and directors can be personally liable for the
torts they commit, whether they were committed in their individual or corporate
capacities.2 1 Although this issue was not before the Seagate Technology court,
the court's holding logically leads to the conclusion that if corporate officers
commit any kind of torts, whether they be intentional or negligent, the acts will
be imputed to them as individuals for purposes of establishing personal jurisdic-
tion. This result goes beyond the holdings of Taylor-Rush and Calder, which
appeared to limit their holdings to situations where corporate officials commit
only intentional torts.
It is clear that Calder has had a significant effect on the fiduciary shield
doctrine in California. The doctrine appears to still exist in California, but Cali-
fornia has recognized several exceptions to the doctrine. First, the doctrine is
inapplicable to intentional tortfeasors who direct their acts at California resi-
dents.212 Second, the doctrine is not available when corporate officials commit
intentional acts for which they could be personally liable.
213
The California courts have not given any indication as to whether the
205. Id. at 701, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 589.
206. IM at 703, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 590.
207. Id. at 703-04, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 590. ("For example, no personal contact would result
from doing nothing more than ratifying an act taken by the corporation or by another corpo-
rate officer.").
208. Id at 703, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 590.
209. Id at 704, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 591.
210. Id. at 703, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 590.
211. Id at 701, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 589.
212. Id at 703, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 590; Taylor-Rush, 217 Cal. App. 3d at 117, 265 Cal. Rptr.
at 680.
213. Seagate Technology, 219 Cal. App. 3d at 703, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 590.
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doctrine is characterized as an element of constitutional due process or as a
component of statutory analysis. It appears, however, that the doctrine is re-
garded as an element of constitutional due process, 214 since California has
recognized the doctrine, and California's long-arm statute is coextensive with
due process.2 15
2. The effect of Calder v. Jones on New York law
a. New York's long-arm statute
The New York long-arm statute is narrower in scope than the due process
clause of the United States Constitution.2 16 Section 302(a) of New York Civil
Practice Law and Rules2 17 allows the assertion of personal jurisdiction over a
non-resident if the party: (1) transacts any business within the state or contracts
anywhere to supply goods or services in New York,2 1 ' (2) commits a tortious act
within New York, except defamation;219 (3) commits a tortious act outside of
the state causing injury to a person or property in New York, except defama-
214. But see Davis v. Metro Prods., 885 F.2d 515, 521 (9th Cir. 1989), where the Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, deciding this case under Arizona law, stated that the United
States Supreme Court in Calder "signalled" that the fiduciary shield doctrine is not a constitu-
tional issue. Id The Davis court concluded that the doctrine is a "state-created corporate
form" designed to create a "due process limit on jurisdiction." Id Thus, the court found that
the fiduciary shield doctrine was inapplicable in Arizona since Arizona had not adopted the
shield, and because the Arizona long-arm statute, like California's, is coextensive with consti-
tutional due process. Ia at 522.
215. Data Disc, 557 F.2d at 1286.
216. Bulk Oil (USA) v. Sun Oil Trading Co., 584 F. Supp. 36,42 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); see N.Y.
Civ. PRAc. L. & R. § 302(a) (McKinney 1990).
217. N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L. & R. § 302(a) (McKinney 1990). Section 302(a) reads:
Personal Jurisdiction by acts of non-domiciliaries
(a) Acts which are the basis ofjurisdiction. As to a cause of action arising from
any of the acts enumerated in this section, a court may exercise personal jurisdiction
over any non-domiciliary, or his executor or administrator, who in person or through
an agent:
1. transacts any business within the state or contracts anywhere to supply
goods or services in the state; or
2. commits a tortious act within the state, except as to a cause of action for
defamation of character arising from the act; or
3. commits a tortious act without the state causing injury to person or prop-
erty within the state, except as to a cause of action for defamation of character aris-
ing from the act, if he
(i) regularly does or solicits business, or engages in any other persistent
course of conduct, or derives substantial revenue from goods used or consumed
or services rendered, in the state, or
(ii) expects or should reasonably expect the act to have consequences in the
state and derives substantial revenue from interstate or international commerce;
or
4. owns, uses or possesses any real property situated within the state.
Id.
218. Id § 302(a)l.
219. Id § 302(a)2.
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tion;2 0 or (4) owns, uses or possesses any real property situated within NewYork.22 1
b. the law in New York prior to Calder v. Jones
The fiduciary shield doctrine originated in New York through a series of
decisions by the New York state and federal courts.22 2 Until Calder, New York
courts consistently upheld the doctrine.22 3 A district court in New York stated,
"It is axiomatic that jurisdiction over an individual cannot be predicated upon
jurisdiction over a corporation. That is to say, an individual's transaction of
business within the state solely as an officer of a corporation does not create
personal jurisdiction over that individual.,
2 24
Although the fiduciary shield doctrine was established law in New York
prior to Calder, the courts could not agree upon the proper legal basis of the
doctrine. In Marine Midland Bank v. Miller,2"s the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit, deciding a case under New York law, held that the doctrine is a
statutory principle, stating that: "The fiduciary shield doctrine is not a constitu-
tional principle, but is rather a doctrine based on judicial inference as to the
intended scope of the long-arm statute. ' ,2 26 While in Bulova Watch Co. v. K.
Hattori & Co.,227 the district court held that the fiduciary shield doctrine is an
element of constitutional due process.223 In reaching this conclusion, the Bulova
Watch court stated, "The constitutional principle underlying the exercise of
long-arm jurisdiction is that there is 'some act by which the defendant purpose-
fully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum state,
thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.' ,229 The court found,
however, "Where the corporate agent engages in corporate business for the sole
benefit of the corporation, it is difficult to see how the exercise of jurisdiction
220. Id. § 302(a)3.
221. I § 302(a)4.
222. See supra notes 70-81 and accompanying text.
223. See, eg., Marine Midland Bank v. Miller, 664 F.2d 899, 902 (2d Cir. 1981); Lehigh
Valley Indus. v. Birenbaum, 527 F.2d 87, 92-93 (2d Cir. 1975); United States v. Montreal
Trust Co., 358 F.2d 239, 243 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 919 (1966); Bulk 011, 584 F.
Supp. at 40; Goshen Litho, Inc. v. Kohls, 582 F. Supp. 1561, 1565 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); Bulova
Watch Co. v. K. Hattori & Co., 508 F. Supp. 1322, 1347-48 (E.D.N.Y. 1981); Grove Press,
Inc. v. CIA, 483 F. Supp. 132, 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Grove
Press, Inc. v. Angleton, 649 F.2d 121 (2d Cir. 1981); Merkel Assocs. v. Bellofram Corp., 437
F. Supp. 612, 618 (W.D.N.Y. 1977); Laurenzano v. Goldman, 96 A.D.2d 852, 853, 465
N.Y.S.2d 779, 780 (1983). But see Hasbro Bradley, Inc. v. Coopers & Lybrand, 121 A.D.2d
870, 871, 503 N.Y.S.2d 792, 794 (1986) (no New York court had adopted the fiduciary shield
doctrine to bar jurisdiction under section 302(a)).
224. Lehigh Valley Indus. v. Birenbaum, 389 F. Supp. 798, 803-04 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 527
F.2d 87 (2d Cir. 1975).
225. 664 F.2d 899 (2d Cir. 1981).
226. Id. at 902 n.3.
227. 508 F. Supp. 1322 (E.D.N.Y. 1981).
228. Id at 1347-48.
229. Id at 1347 (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958)).
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over one who has conducted no activities on his own behalf 'comports with fair
play and substantial justice.' ,,23o
c. the law in New York after Calder v. Jones
Since the United States Supreme Court decided Calder, the New York law
regarding the fiduciary shield doctrine could be categorized as inconsistent at
best. For example, in Guccione v. Flynt,231 one New York district court de-
clared that Calder rejected the fiduciary shield doctrine altogether, stating that:
"The Supreme Court ... has recently rejected the proposition that employees
who act in their official capacity are shielded from suit in their individual capac-
ity."' 232 The court failed to supply any rationale for this interpretation of
Calder.
In contrast, many New York courts, just after Calder was decided, contin-
ued to apply the doctrine without any reference to Calder.2 33 In Soltex Polymer
Corp. v. Fortex Industries,234 for instance, another district court stated that the
fiduciary shield doctrine precluded the exercise of jurisdiction over corporate
officials under every provision of the New York long-arm statute.2 35 Addition-
ally, many of these courts concluded that the doctrine could be applied to shield
officials from jurisdiction even when the individuals committed tortious acts.2 36
Still other New York courts, considering Calder, stated that the Calder
decision did not even address the fiduciary shield doctrine. In Axelrad v. Carl
230. Id at 1348.
231. 1984 Copyright L. Rep. (CCH) 25,654 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 30, 1984).
232. Id. at 18,947.
233. See, ag., Shopping Mall Investors v. E.G. Frances & Co., No. 84 Civ 1469, at *2-*3
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 29, 1987) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file); Totalplan Corp. v. Lure Camera,
613 F. Supp. 451, 457-58 (W.D.N.Y. 1985); Lancer Prods. v. Rally Accessories, 597 F. Supp.
440, 441-42 (E.D.N.Y. 1984); Conniff v. Dodd, Mead & Co., 593 F. Supp. 266, 268 (S.D.N.Y.
1984); Soltex Polymer Corp. v. Fortex Indus., 590 F. Supp. 1453, 1457-58 (E.D.N.Y. 1984);
Picower v. Lynn Wilson Assocs., No. 83 Civ. 4717 (S.D.N.Y. May 23, 1984) (LEXIS, Genfed
library, Dist file) (mem.); Photo Promotions Assocs. v. Household Int'l, 584 F. Supp. 1238,
1240 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); Sheldon v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 105 A.D.2d 273, 275-76, 482
N.Y.S.2d 867, 869 (1984); Laufer v. Ostrow, 55 N.Y.2d 305, 313, 449 N.Y.S.2d 456, 460
(1982).
234. 590 F. Supp. 1453 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
235. Id. at 1458.
236. Shopping Mall Investors, No. 84 Civ. 1469, LEXIS at *2-*3 (applied fiduciary shield
doctrine despite allegations of fraud and breach of fiduciary duty); Totalplan, 613 F. Supp. at
457-58 (fiduciary shield doctrine "confers jurisdictional immunity upon corporate officials,
even though their conduct be tortious, as long as the actions taken were in the interests of the
corporation and not purely personal, and the corporation is not merely a shell for the individ-
ual, and does not lack sufficient assets to respond"); Pfcower, No. 83 Civ. 4717, LEXIS (ap-
plied fiduciary shield doctrine to defeat jurisdiction over defendant who alledgedly committed
fraud in conversations with the plaintiff in New York); Sheldon, 105 A.D.2d at 275, 482
N.Y.S.2d at 869 ("As a general rule, this doctrine protects an out-of-state corporate officer
from being subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of New York for tortious acts committed
without the State, unless that officer was acting in his own personal interest rather than on
behalf of the corporation.").
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Byoir & Associates, 237 the district court held that Calder had absolutely no influ-
ence on the doctrine, and the doctrine is "still very much alive. ' 238 The.Axelrad
court stated that although the Supreme Court in Calder and Keeton discussed
the issue of personal jurisdiction, it never reached "the issue of the fiduciary
shield doctrine., 239  Consequently, the Axelrad court concluded that the
Supreme Court allowed the assertion ofjurisdiction over Calder and South, "not
because the fiduciary shield doctrine is dead, but because 'jurisdiction over peti-
tioners in California [was] proper because of their intentional conduct in Florida
calculated to cause injury to respondent in California.' ,
Another line of authority in New York has held that the Calder Court
merely eliminated the fiduciary shield doctrine as an element of constitutional
due process, but preserved it as a state-created limitation on a state's long-arm
statute.241 As a result, these courts have held that the doctrine is still available
in New York, since the New York courts have adopted the fiduciary shield doc-
trine as a limitation on the reach of their long-arm statute.242
For example, in Thomson McKinnon Securities v. Hamiltonian Indus-
tries,2 4 3 the district court stated that: "Although Calder eliminate[d] the fiduci-
ary shield doctrine as a consideration of due process, it [did] not compel New
York to abandon it as an equitable doctrine in the construction of its own stat-
ute."244 The district court explained that the Supreme Court in Calder rejected
the fiduciary shield doctrine when it held that jurisdiction over Calder and South
was proper in California despite the fact that their actions were taken on behalf
of their employer.245 But the Thomson McKinnon Securities court stated that
Calder only eliminated the doctrine as an element of constitutional due process,
because the Supreme Court had analyzed the case under the California long-arm
statute, which is coextensive with the due process clause.246 Since there was no
separate statutory inquiry to consider in Calder, the Supreme Court was only
concerned with the constitutional inquiry-"whether the Due Process Clause
required the fiduciary shield doctrine to be incorporated into the 'minimum con-
tacts' test of World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson."
247
Consequently, the Thomson McKinnon Securities court concluded that,
although Calder rejected the fiduciary shield doctrine as an element of
237. No. 84 Civ. 8936 (S.D.N.Y. July 15, 1985) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file) (mem.).
238. IdL
239. Id at n.3.
240. Id (quoting Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 791 (1984)).
241. See Cutco Indus. v. Naughton, 806 F.2d 361, 367 (2d Cir. 1986) (applying New York
law); Rolls-Royce Motors v. Charles Schmitt & Co., 657 F. Supp. 1040, 1059 (S.D.N.Y. 1987);
Nordic Bank PLC v. Trend Group, 619 F. Supp. 542, 569 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); Thomson McKin-
non Sec. v. Hamiltonian Indus., 610 F. Supp. 5, 7 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
242. See, e.g., Thomson McKinnon Sec., 610 F. Supp. at 7.
243. 610 F. Supp. 5 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
244. Id. at 7.
245. Id
246. Id.
247. Id. (citing World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980)).
[Vol. 24:809
FIDUCIARY SHIELD DOCTRINE
constitutional due process, it did not reject the doctrine as a component of the
statutory analysis.248 Therefore, the Thomson McKinnon Securities court held
that the doctrine was still available in states like New York, where the long-arm
statute is more restrictive than the United States Constitution.2 49
The most recent trend by the courts in New York has been to reject the
fiduciary shield doctrine, both as an element of the constitutional analysis and as
an element of the New York statutory analysis.250 The case that is most often
cited for this position is Kreutter v. McFadden Oil Corp. 251 In Kreutter, the New
York Court of Appeals, without offering any explanation, stated that the United
States Supreme Court, in Calder and Keeton, held that the fiduciary shield doc-
trine was not a constitutional requirement.252 The Kreutter court also held that,
although several New York federal courts and some of the departments of the
New York Appellate Division had accepted the doctrine,25 3 the New York
Court of Appeals, the highest court in New York, had not adopted the doctrine
in the past, and it would not adopt it at that point.
254
The Kreutter court gave several reasons why it would not adopt the doc-
trine in New York. First, there is nothing in the language or the legislative
history of New York's long-arm statute indicating that fiduciaries should be
shielded from jurisdiction when their actions are taken in their corporate capaci-
ties.2 5 Second, the doctrine is not necessary as a matter of fairness because
"[t]he equitable concerns which motivated development of the doctrine are am-
ply protected by constitutional due process requisites which guarantee that juris-
diction over a nonresident will be sustained only when the demand for his
presence is reasonable and consistent with notions of 'fair play and substantial
248. Id
249. Id.
250. See Retail Software Servs. v. Lashlee, 854 F.2d 18, 22 (2d Cir. 1988) (applying New
York law); Facit, Inc. v. Krueger, Inc., 732 F. Supp. 1267, 1269 (S.D.N.Y. 1990); Schieffelin &
Co v. Jack Co. of Boca, 725 F. Supp. 1314, 1318 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); Besicorp Group v. Crown
Life Ins., No. 88-CV-114, at *16 (N.D.N.Y. May 17, 1989) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file)
(mem.); Ross v. Hamilton Beach, Inc., No. 89 Civ. 0079, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 4, 1989)
(LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file); Maier-Schule GMC v. General Motors Corp., 1989-1
Trade Cas. (CCH) % 68,409, at 60,255 (W.D.N.Y. Nov. 30, 1988); Davidson v. Vohann of
Cal., Inc., No. 87 Civ. 3842, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 22, 1988) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist
file); American Say. Bank v. Cheshire Mgmt., 693 F. Supp. 42, 45 (S.D.N.Y. 1988); Kreutter
v. McFadden Oil Corp., 71 N.Y.2d 460,470-72, 522 N.E.2d 40,46-47, 527 N.Y.S.2d 195, 201-
02, (1988); cf Deutsch v. Integrated Barter Int'l, 700 F. Supp. 194, 202 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) ("the
fiduciary shield doctrine is of questionable validity in New York"); CPC Int'l v. McKesson
Corp., 70 N.Y.2d 268, 287, 514 N.E.2d 116, 125-26, 519 N.Y.S.2d 804, 814 (1987) (court
stated that the New York Court of Appeal had never adopted fiduciary shield doctrine).
251. 71 N.Y.2d 460, 522 N.E.2d 40, 527 N.Y.S.2d 195 (1988).
252. Id at 470-71, 522 N.E.2d at 46, 527 N.Y.S.2d at 201 (citing Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S.
783 (1984); Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, 465 U.S. 770 (1984)).
253. Id.
254. Id at 469-72, 522 N.E.2d at 45-47, 527 N.Y.S.2d at 200-02.
255. Id. at 470, 522 N.E.2d at 46, 527 N.Y.S.2d at 201.
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justice.' ,256 The court added that the New York long-arm statute itself takes
into account equitable concerns by not authorizing the exercise of personal juris-
diction in every case where it would be constitutionally permissible.2" Finally,
the court stated that the fiduciary shield doctrine is not desirable as a matter of
public policy because it "unfairly prejudic[es] plaintiffs who seek relief against
defendants conducting affairs in this State.",
258
The New York Court of Appeal's decision in Kreutter has been followed by
several district courts2 59 and the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,
2' 6
and has gained general acceptance as the current law regarding the fiduciary
shield doctrine in New York. Thus, as one court put it, "New York's highest
court sound[ed] the death knell to the fiduciary shield doctrine."
26 1
3. The effect of Calder v. Jones on Other States
a. the legal basis of the fiduciary shield doctrine
Like California and New York, there has been considerable disagreement in
other states on the issue of the proper legal basis of the fiduciary shield doctrine.
Since the United States Supreme Court was not clear in its analysis regarding
the doctrine in Calder, some courts have held that the doctrine is an element of
constitutional due process,262 while other courts have concluded that the doc-
trine is an element of statutory analysis.2 63
256. Id. (quoting International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)).
257. Id. at 471, 522 N.E.2d at 46, 527 N.Y.S.2d at 201. The court commented that the case
before it provided a good example of why the doctrine is not necessary to prevent inequitable
results. Id Since the plaintiff had obtained jurisdiction over the corporation, the corporate
official would probably be its principal witness and would have to travel to New York to serve
in this capacity anyway. Id The court explained:
[T]he inconvenience the corporate official faces if made a party to the suit individu-
ally is minimal and, as a result, notions of fairness do not require us to shield him
from the reach of the long-arm statute. Inasmuch as the constitutional and statutory
safeguards sufficiently alleviate the equitable concerns posed by long-arm jurisdic-
tion, there is "no convincing reason why the mere fact of corporate employment
should alter the jurisdictional calculus."
Id. (quoting Koenig, Personal Jurisdiction and the Corporate Employee: Minimum Contacts
Meet the Fiduciary Shield, 38 STAN. L. Rnv. 813, 830 (1986)).
258. Id.
259. Madison Nat'l Bank v. NMM Realty Dev. Bank, No. 86 Civ. 5115, at *2 (S.D.N.Y.
Sept. 18, 1990) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file) (mem.); Department of Economic Dev. v.
Arthur Andersen & Co., No. 85 Civ. 1292, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 8, 1990) (LEXIS, Genfed
library, Dist file) (mem.); Facit, Inc., 732 F. Supp. at 1269; Schieffelin & Co., 725 F. Supp. at
1318; Besicorp Group, No. 88-CV-114, LEXIS at *16; Ross, No. 89 Civ. 0079, LEXIS at *2;
Maier-Schule GMC, 1989-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) at 60,255; Davidson, No. 87 Civ. 3842, LEXIS
at *5; American Sav. Bank, 693 F. Supp. at 45.
260. Retail Software, 854 F.2d at 22.
261. Maier-Schule GMC, 1981 Trade Cas. (CCH) at 60,255.
262. See infra notes 264-81 and accompanying text.
263. See infra notes 282-304 and accompanying text.
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(i) states finding that the fiduciary shield doctrine
is an element of constitutional due process
Several courts, both before and after Calder was decided, have stated that
the fiduciary shield doctrine was an element of constitutional due process.
Courts in the states of Idaho,2 6 Iowa,
2 65 IInoiS,
26 6 Ohio,
2 6 7 and New Jersey268
reached this conclusion before Calder was decided.
One of these courts, an Idaho district court, in Idaho Potato Commission v.
Washington Potato Commission,2 69 found that the doctrine was an element of
the constitutional analysis, since it would be against "fair play and substantial
justice" and, therefore, unconstitutional to extend jurisdiction over corporate
officials based on acts taken in their corporate capacities.27 0 The court reasoned
that it would be difficult to conclude that these corporate officials personally
availed themselves of the "'privilege of conducting activities within the forum
State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.' ,,271 The Idaho
Potato Commission court also stated that it would be difficult to find that these
corporate officials reasonably anticipated being haled into a forum state for ac-
tivities conducted on behalf of the corporation, when those same activities would
not subject them to personal liability.
272
After the Supreme Court decided Calder, a number of courts in the states
264. See Idaho Potato Comm'n v. Washington Potato Comm'n, 410 F. Supp. 171, 183 (D.
Idaho 1975).
265. See Martin v. Ju-Li Corp., 332 N.W.2d 871, 874 (Iowa 1983); State ex rel. Miller v.
Internal Energy Mgmt., 324 N.W.2d 707, 711 (Iowa 1982).
266. See State Sec. Ins. v. Frank B. Hall & Co., 530 F. Supp. 94, 98 (N.D. Ill. 1981).
267. See Weller v. Cromwell Oil Co., 504 F.2d 927, 931 (6th Cir. 1974) (deciding case
under Ohio law, court stated that "even if the statute were construed to permit suit in Ohio we
would still be faced with grave questions as to its constitutionality. We have serious doubt
whether the activities of the corporate officers in behalf of the corporations... are sufficient so
as to make it reasonable and just, consistent with traditional notions of fair play, and in con-
formity with due process requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment that the individuals be
subjected to suit in Ohio to enforce personal liability arising out of such activities.").
268. See Sharp Elecs. Corp. v. Hayman Cash Register Co., 1982-2 Trade Cas. (CCII)
64,803, at 71,957-58 (D.N.J. May 20, 1982).
269. 410 F. Supp. 171 (D. Idaho 1975).
270. Id. at 183.
271. Id. at 183 n.6 (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958)).
272. Id at 182.
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of Iflinois, 273 New Hampshire,274 Oklahoma,275 Pennsylvania, 276 and Texas277
also concluded that the fiduciary shield doctrine was an element of constitu-
tional due process. For example, an Oklahoma district court, in McClelland v.
Watling Ladder Co.,278 reasoned that the fiduciary shield doctrine was a compo-
nent of constitutional due process on the basis that both the doctrine and the due
process clause are "animated by a similar concern for fairness." 2 79 In addition,
a Pennsylvania district court, in Moran v. Metropolitan District Council,2 80 con-
cluded that: "Disregarding activity undertaken on behalf of a corporation re-
gardless of the circumstances would be inconsistent with the flexibility inherent
in the jurisprudence of personal jurisdiction since the Supreme Court decided
International Shoe. 25 1
These courts are correct that the fairness considerations that underlie the
constitutional jurisdictional analysis mandate the application of the fiduciary
shield doctrine. Accordingly, the doctrine should be considered as being
grounded in principles of constitutional due process.
(ii) states finding that the fiduciary shield doctrine
is an element of statutory analysis
Numerous courts, on the other hand, have found that the fiduciary shield
273. See Rog v. Professional Window & House Cleaning, No. 84 C 4198 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 1,
1986) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file) (mem.); Rollins v. Eliwood, Nos. 69697, 69698, at
*47-*51 (Ill. Nov. 30, 1990) (LEXIS, States library, Ill file). But see In re Mahurkar Double
Lumen Hemodialysis Catheter Patent Lit., 750 F. Supp. 330, 335 (N.D. Ill. 1990) (stated that
Calder established that the United States Constitution does not require states to adopt the
fiduciary shield doctrine); Hyatt Corp. v. Club Regency Int'l, No. 85 C 7540 (N.D. Inl. July 11,
1986) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file) (mem.) ("In Calder, the Supreme Court noted that
nothing in the [United States] Constitution insulates employee defendants from jurisdiction
merely because of their employee status.").
274. See Estabrook v. Wetmore, 529 A.2d 956, 958-59 (N.H. 1987).
275. See McClelland v. Watling Ladder Co., 729 F. Supp. 1316, 1321 (W.D. Okla. 1990).
276. See Bowers v. NETI Technologies, 690 F. Supp. 349, 359 (E.D. Pa. 1988); Rittenhouse
& Lee v. Dollars & Sense, No. 83-5996, at *13 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 15, 1987) (LEXIS, Genfed
library, Dist file) (mem.); Moran v. Metropolitan Dist. Council, 640 F. Supp. 430, 432, 434
(E.D. Pa. 1986); Simpkins Corp. v. Gourmet Resources Int'l, 601 F. Supp. 1336, 1345 (E.D.
Pa. 1985); PSC Professional Servs. Group v. American Digital Sys., 555 F. Supp. 788, 792-94
(E.D. Pa. 1983). But see Steele v. Walker, No. 84-3325 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 5, 1985) (LEXIS,
Genfed library, Dist file) (mem.) ("This contention, that employees and directors who act in
their corporate capacity are somehow shielded from personal jurisdiction for their wrongdo-
ings, was rejected by the Supreme Court in Calder v. Jones.").
277. See Saktides v. Cooper, 742 F. Supp. 382, 385 (W.D. Tex. 1990) (court considers the
doctrine as a "sub-issue of due process"). But see Donovan v. Grim Hotel Co., 747 F.2d 966,
973-74 (5th Cir. 1984), cert denied, 471 U.S. 1124 (1985) (citing Calder, court held due pro-
cess is not offended when a non-resident corporate agent or employee is made subject to per-
sonal jurisdiction in Texas for acts performed in his or her corporate capacity).
278. 729 F. Supp. 1316 (W.D. Okla. 1990).
279. Id at 1321.
280. 640 F. Supp. 430 (E.D. Pa. 1986).
281. Id at 434.
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doctrine is not an element of constitutional analysis, rather, it is a component of
the statutory analysis. Unfortunately, none of these courts has provided any
analysis for reaching this conclusion. Yet, without any justification, courts have
held, both before and after Calder, that the fiduciary shield doctrine was a com-
ponent of the statutory analysis. Courts in Maryland
28 2 and South Carolina28 3
reached this conclusion prior to Calder.
In addition, several courts since Calder was decided, have found that the
fiduciary shield doctrine was a statutory principle. Some of these courts reached
this conclusion as a result of their interpretation of Calder, while other courts
reached this conclusion independent of Calder.
Courts in the states of Arkansas, 28 4 Michigan,28 5 Minnesota,286 and Ne-
braska28 7 based their holdings on the Calder decision. Unfortunately, none of
these courts explained the rationale behind its conclusions. For example, in
Byer v. Gordos Arkansas, Inc.,28 an Arkansas district court stated that as a
result of Calder and Keeton, "a constitutional due process analysis properly dis-
regards the fiduciary shield doctrine entirely, and if such shield continues to
exist at all, it must do so by virtue of state substantive tort law or state-imposed
limitations of extra-territorial judicial jurisdiction short of the fullest extent al-
lowed by due process.",
28 9
Conversely, courts in the states of Connecticut,
290 Delaware, 29 1 Kansas,292
282. See Copiers Typewriters Calculators, Inc. v. Toshiba Corp., 576 F. Supp. 312, 329 (D.
Md. 1983).
283. See Columbia Briargate Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 713 F.2d 1052, 1064 (4th Cir. 1983),
cert. denied sub nor. Pearson v. Columbia Briargate Co., 465 U.S. 1007 (1984) (applying
South Carolina law).
284. See Byer v. Gordos Ark., Inc., 712 F. Supp. 149, 155 (W.D. Ark. 1989).
285. See Chicago Blower Corp. v. Air Sys. Assocs., 623 F. Supp. 798, 804 (E.D. Mich.
1985) ("Michigan courts have not adopted the fiduciary shield doctrine, and due process does
not command this court to apply it in the absence of state law requirements.").
286. See Garber v. Jack's Corn Crib, No. 4-86-740, at *25-*26 (D. Minn. July 18, 1988)
(LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file).
287. See McGowan Grain, Inc. v. Sanburg, 225 Neb. 129, 145-46, 403 N.W.2d 340, 351
(1987) (court held Calder eliminated the fiduciary shield doctrine as a constitutional principle,
but did not adopt the doctrine as a limitation on its long-arm statute).
288. 712 F. Supp. 149 (W.D. Ark. 1989).
289. Id. at 155.
290. See Mozes v. Welch, 638 F. Supp. 215, 223-24 (D. Conn. 1986).
291. See Plummer & Co. Realtors v. Crisafi, 533 A.2d 1242, 1246-48 (Del. 1987).
292. See Ceva Laboratories v. Wilson, No. 88-2609-S, at *5 (D. Kan. Aug. 21, 1989)
(LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file) (mem.); Drez v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, No. 86-2176-S (D.
Kan. Oct. 15, 1986) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist fie) (mem.). But see Wilshire Oil Co. of
Tex. v. Rifle, 409 F.2d 1277, 1282 (10th Cir. 1969) (fiduciary shield doctrine was found to be a
constitutional principle under Kansas law); Traffas v. Bridge Capital Corp., No 90-1304-C, at
*13 (D. Kan. Nov. 30, 1990) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file) (mem.) ("This court believes
the fiduciary shield doctrine is best handled as an important element in the due process
considerations.").
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Maryland, 2 9 3 Massachusetts, 2 9 4 West Virginia 2 95 and the District of Colum-
bia296 have concluded that the fiduciary shield doctrine was an element of statu-
tory analysis without any reference to Calder. Likewise, these courts failed to
provide any explanation for this result.
Several of the courts that found the doctrine to be a statutory principle also
stated that it was not available in states where the long-arm statute extends to
the outermost limits of due process.2 97 These courts reason that since the doc-
trine is not a component of constitutional due process, the doctrine does not
apply in a state where the long-arm statute is coextensive with due process.
2 98
As a component of the statutory analysis, these courts state that the doctrine can
only be applied in states where the long-arm statute is more limited than what is
permitted by the due process clause.29 9 Consequently, the doctrine has been
found to be unavailable in Michigan,3c 0 Minnesota,30 1 West Virginia,30 2 and
possibly in Maryland.30 3 Nevertheless, a court in Kansas held that the doctrine
293. See Western Contracting Corp. v. Bechtel Corp., 885 F.2d 1196, 1200 (4th Cir. 1989);
Birrane v. Master Collectors, 738 F. Supp. 167, 169 n.1 (D. Md. 1990); Zeman v. Lotus Heart,
Inc., 717 F. Supp. 373, 376 (D. Md. 1989).
294. See Yankee Group v. Yamashita, 678 F. Supp. 20, 22 (D. Mass. 1988) (mem.) ("Mas-
sachusetts courts have never recognized the fiduciary shield doctrine as a limitation on the
reach of the [Massachusetts] long-arm statute... [and] it is unlikely that Massachusetts would
adopt such a limitation in view of the fact that its long-arm statute is intended to reach the
limits of the United States Constitution."); Johnson Creative Arts v. Wool Masters, Inc., 573
F. Supp. 1106, 1111 (D. Mass. 1983), aff'd on other grounds, 743 F.2d 947 (1st Cir. 1984)
(Massachusetts long-arm statute is not limited by fiduciary shield doctrine).
295. See Pittsburgh Terminal Corp. v. Mid Allegheny Corp., 831 F.2d 522, 525 (4th Cir.
1987) (applying West Virginia law).
296. See Chase v. Pan-Pacific Broadcasting, 617 F. Supp. 1414, 1423 (D. D.C. 1985) (Dis-
trict of Columbia has not applied the fiduciary shield doctrine to its long-arm statute in the
past, and the court did not do so in this case).
297. See Western Contracting, 885 F.2d at 1200 (applying Maryland law); Pittsburgh Ter-
minal, 831 F.2d at 525 (applying Maryland law); Birrane, 738 F. Supp. at 169 n.1; Zeman, 717
F. Supp. at 376; Byer, 712 F. Supp. at 155; Garber, No. 4-86-740, LEXIS at *25-*26; Chicago
Blower Corp., 623 F. Supp. at 803; Chase, 617 F. Supp. at 1423.
298. See e.g., Birrane, 738 F. Supp. at 169.
299. Id.
300. See Chicago Blower, 623 F. Supp. at 803. The court added that: "The Calder decision
has been interpreted by almost all courts as holding that where the state long-arm statute
extends to the limit of due process, the exercise of jurisdiction over corporate officers who
individually have had minimum contacts with the forum is permissible, even if those contacts
were made in their capacity as corporate officers." Id. at 804.
301. See Garber, No. 4-86-740, LEXIS at *25-*26. The court stated: "Most courts inter-
preting the Calder decision have held that 'where the State long-arm statute extends to the
limit of due process, the exercise of jurisdiction over corporate officers who individually have
had minimum contacts with the forum is permissible, even if those contacts were made in their
capacity as corporate officers.'" Id. (quoting Chicago Blower Corp. v. Air Sys. Assocs., 623
F. Supp. 798, 804 (E.D. Mich. 1985)).
302. See Pittsburgh Terminal, 831 F.2d at 525 (fiduciary shield doctrine is not available in
West Virginia because the West Virginia long-arm statute is coextensive with the full reach of
due process).
303. See Western Contracting, 885 F.2d at 1200 (as a statutory principle, fiduciary shield
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was available as a statutory limitation, even though the Kansas long-arm statute
is coextensive with due process.
304
States have interpreted the fiduciary shield doctrine and the Calder decision
in many different ways. Part of the reason for this confusion is the vague treat-
ment of the fiduciary shield doctrine in Calder. The debate whether the fiduci-
ary shield doctrine is an element of constitutional due process or an element of
statutory law continues today.
b. the limitations of the fiduciary shield doctrine
,Courts have also been inconsistent in the types of limitations they have im-
posed upon the application of the fiduciary shield doctrine. Some of these limi-
tations are the result of the courts' interpretation of Calder and some are the
result of the courts' own refinement of the doctrine.
The most significant limitation upon the fiduciary shield doctrine, imposed
by some states, is that the doctrine does not apply when corporate officials com-
mit certain torts. As discussed above, Calder should be interpreted to hold that
the doctrine is not available to shield corporate officials from personal jurisdic-
tion when those officials commit intentional torts directed at residents of forum
states. 30 5 Courts in Alabama,30 6 Illinois, 30 7 Kansas, 308 and Vermont 3° 9 have
agreed with this interpretation of Calder.
One of these courts, the Alabama Supreme Court, in Duke v. Young,
310
declined to invoke the fiduciary shield doctrine to immunize six non-resident
doctrine may not be recognized under Maryland law since the Maryland long-arm statute has
been interpreted by the Maryland Court of Appeals as exercising jurisdiction to the limits of
due process); Birrane, 738 F. Supp. at 169 n.1 (as a statutory principle, fiduciary shield doc-
trine may not be recognized under Maryland law since the Maryland long-arm statute has
been interpreted by the Maryland Court of Appeals as exercising jurisdiction to the limits of
due process). But see Zeman, 717 F. Supp. at 376 (fiduciary shield doctrine can only be ap-
plied to those provisions of the Maryland long-arm statute which do not extend jurisdiction to
the peripheral limits of due process).
304. See Drez, No. 86-2176-S, LEXIS.
305. See supra notes 163-74 and accompanying text.
306. See Duke v. Young, 496 So. 2d 37, 40 (Ala. 1986) (fiduciary shield doctrine only
applies to defeat personal jurisdiction over corporate officials who are charged with "mere
untargeted negligence," the doctrine is inapplicable when the official is charged with and "in-
tentional, and alledgedly tortious actions" expressly aimed at the forum); Brooks v. Inlow, 453
So. 2d 349, 355 (Ala. 1984).
307. See Rollins, Nos. 69697, 69698, LEXIS at *40; see also Ben Kozloff, Inc. v. Seamark
Corp., No. 85 C 4634 (N.D. Ill. June 4, 1986) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file) (mem.) (fidu-
ciary shield doctrine does not bar jurisdiction when non-resident alledgedly engages in fraudu-
lent activity for his or her own benefit rather than for the benefit of the corporation). But see
Veal Assocs. v. ICI Arns., No. 86 C 7138 (E.D. Ill. Nov. 17, 1986) (LEXIS, Genfed library,
Dist file) (mem.) (court applied fiduciary shield doctrine despite allegations of tortious interfer-
ence with business relationship and fraud).
308. See Traffas, No. 90-1304-C, LEXIS at *11-*28.
309. See Stuart v. Federal Energy Sys., 596 F. Supp. 458, 462 (D. Vt. 1984).
310. 496 So. 2d 37 (Ala. 1986).
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directors from personal jurisdiction because they were charged with fraudulently
concealing material facts.311 The court stated that Calder made it clear that
corporate officials charged with "intentional, and alledgedly tortious, actions"
that are expressly aimed at residents of the forum, will be subjected to personal
jurisdiction.312 However, the court also recognized that had the corporate offi-
cials been charged with "mere untargeted negligence," the fiduciary shield doc-
trine could have been applied to defeat jurisdiction.
3 13
In addition, the Iowa Supreme Court, in State ex reL Miller v. Internal
Energy Management, 314 concluded that the doctrine should not be applied to
defeat jurisdiction when a corporate official alledgedly perpetrates a fraud upon
the plaintiff, because "[tlo hold otherwise would mean that an individual, con-
templating the commission of fraud in other jurisdictions could escape jurisdic-
tion there by simply committing the fraud through a corporation."
3 15
In Maryland, courts have held that the doctrine is inapplicable in situations
where corporate officials commit personal or business torts.316 Courts in Kan-
sas3 17 and New Hampshire3 18 have gone even further so as to preclude the ap-
plication of the doctrine when corporate officials commit any tortious acts
within the forum.
319
Another limitation upon the fiduciary shield doctrine, imposed by courts in
311. Id at 40.
312. Id
313. I d; see also Brooks, 453 So. 2d at 354 (since corporate officials were charged with
"mere untargeted negligence," the assertion of personal jurisdiction over them would offend
traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice).
314. 324 N.W.2d 707 (Iowa 1982).
315. Id at 716.
316. See Power Conversion, Inc. v. Saft Am., Inc., 672 F. Supp. 224, 229 n.6 (D. Md. 1987)
(price-fixing conspiracy); In re Mid Atlantic Toyota Antitrust Lit., 525 F. Supp. 1265, 1270-71
(D. Md. 1981) (price-fixing conspiracy). But see Cawley v. Bloch, 544 F. Supp. 133, 135-36
(D. Md. 1982) (fiduciary shield doctrine applies despite allegations of tortious conduct by
corporate officer).
317. See Ceva Laboratories, No. 88-2609-S, LEXIS at *5 (negligent misrepresentation and
fraud).
318. See Estabrook, 529 A.2d at 959 (breach of duty of reasonable care by performing cer-
tain acts negligently and failing to perform certain other acts).
319. See also Columbia Briargate, 713 F.2d at 1064-65, where the Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit, deciding a case under South Carolina law, held:
[W]hen a non-resident corporate agent is sued for a tort committed by him in his
corporate capacity in the forum state in which service is made upon him without the
forum under the applicable state long-arm statute as authorized by Rule 4(e), he is
properly subject to the jurisdiction of the forum court, provided the long-arm statute
of the forum state is coextensive with the full reach of due process. On the other hand,
if the claim against the corporate agent rests on nothing more than that he is an
officer or employee of the non-resident corporation and if any connection he had with
the commission of the tort occurred without the forum state, we agree that, under
sound due process principles, the nexus between the corporate agent and the forum
state is too tenuous to support jurisdiction over the agent personally by reason of
service under the long-arm statute of the forum state.
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Georgia,3 2 0 Pennsylvania 32 1 and Wisconsin,32 2 is that the doctrine cannot be
applied to defeat jurisdiction if a corporate official could be personally liable for
his or her acts. A Pennsylvania district court, in Donner v. Trans- Witmark Mu-
sic Library,3 2 3 stated that: "It would be anomalous, and would defeat the pur-
poses of the law creating substantive liability, to permit a corporate officer to
shield himself from jurisdiction by means of the corporate entity, when he could
not interpose the same shield as a defense against substantive liability."3 2 4 In
contrast, courts in Illinois3 2 5 and New Jersey3 2 6 have expressly rejected the no-
tion that the personal liability of corporate officials is tied to the exercise of
personal jurisdiction over those officials.
One restriction that has been recognized by many states, including
320. See Delong Equip. Co. v. Washington Mills Abrasive, 840 F.2d 843, 851-52 (11th Cir.
1988) (applying Georgia law).
321. See Moran, 640 F. Supp. at 434; Donner v. Trans-Witmark Music Library, 480 F.
Supp. 1229, 1234 (E.D. Pa. 1979). But see Simkins, 601 F. Supp. at 1345 ("a plaintiff seeking
to establish personal jurisdiction over an individual corporate officer or director on the basis of
tortious conduct committed in the exercise of his corporate duties must prove, by a preponder-
ance of the evidence, that the non-resident officer or director independently has sufficient fo-
rmm-related contacts").
322. See Oxmans' Erwin Meat Co. v. Blacketer, 273 N.W.2d 285, 289 (Wis. 1979).
323. 480 F. Supp. 1229 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
324. Id at 1234. But see PSC Professional Serv& Group, 555 F. Supp. at 791 ("It is essential
to understand that Donner does not hold that Pennsylvania may assert jurisdiction over corpo-
rate officers simply by virtue of their participation in tortious activity on behalf of a corpora-
tion which itself is subject to jurisdiction in this state.").
325. See West Coast Video Enters. v. Ponce de Leon, No. 90 C 1236, at *30 -*31 (N.D. Ill.
Feb. 1, 1991) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file) (mem.); Riga Int'l Corp. v. Alpem, No. 87 C
3422, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 17, 1987) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file) (mem.); Olinski v.
Duce, 155 IMI. App. 3d 441, 444, 508 N.E.2d 398, 400 (1987); Burnhope v. National Mortgage
Equity Corp., No. 1-90-0143, at *23-*24 (Ill. App. Dec. 27, 1990) (LEXIS, States library, Ill
file). But see McHugh v. Blumenfeld, No. 85 C 4177 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 27, 1985) (LEXIS,
Genfed library, Ill file) (mem.) ("Where a defendant engages in acts on his own behalf in such
a way as to impose personal liability, the fiduciary shield doctrine is not a defense to the
assertion of personal jurisdiction."); Club Assistance Program v. Zukerman, 594 F. Supp. 341,
345 (N.D. Ill. 1984) (where a corporate official engages in acts for which he or she is personally
liabile, the official can not invoke the fiduciary shield because his or her actions were not taken
only on the corporation's behalf); see also In re Mahurkar, 750 F. Supp. at 336 (Illinois district
court doubts that Illinois state courts would hold that the fiduciary shield doctrine could shield
an official from jurisdiction even when that individual could be personally liable for his or her
actions, because to do so "would block litigation everywhere.").
326. See Educational Testing Serv. v. Katzman, 631 F. Supp. 550, 559 (D.NJ. 1986) ("cor-
porate officers are liable for torts committed in their corporate capacities and... the issues of
liability and jurisdiction should be analyzed separately.").
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Delaware,32 7  Illinois,328  Kansas,
329  Oklahoma,330  Tennessee,3 3
1
Texas, 332 Utah,3 3 3 Wisconsin, 334 and Wyoming,335 is that the doctrine should
not be used to shield an individual from jurisdiction when the corporation is the
alter-ego or "shell" of the individual, or where the corporation lacks sufficient
assets to respond to the suit. In Torco Oil Co. v. Innovative Thermal Corp., an
Illinois district court stated that when the alter-ego exception applies, the corpo-
ration's contacts are attributed to the individual, because "while it appears on
the face that the individual is acting in a representative capacity, he is in fact
pursuing self-interest, and thus it 'will not advance notions of fairness to allow
the owner of the corporation to invoke the protections of the fiduciary shield
doctrine.' )9337
Several courts have recognized another limitation to the fiduciary shield
doctrine. As an equitable doctrine, these courts state that the fiduciary shield
should not be applied mechanically, as a per se rule. Instead, they hold that the
doctrine should be applied flexibly, according to the facts of each case. States
327. See Plummer, 533 A.2d at 1246-47.
328. See West Coast Video Enters., No. 90 C 1236, LEXIS at *31-*32; FBN Food Servs. v.
Sizzler Restaurants, Int'l, No. 90 C 1001, at *6 (N.D. Ill. May 1, 1990) (LEXIS, Genfed
library, Dist file); Torco Oil Co. v. Innovative Thermal Corp., 730 F. Supp. 126, 135-36 (N.D.
Ill. 1989); Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank v. Premier Sys., No. 88 C 7703, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 14,
1989) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file) (mem.); Kula v. J.K. Schofield & Co., 668 F. Supp,
1126, 1129 (N.D. Ill. 1987); Hyatt Corp., No. 85 C 7540, LEXIS; Brainerd & Bridges v. We-
ingeroff Enters., No. 85 C 493 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 13, 1985) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file)
(mem.); State Sec. Ins., 530 F. Supp. at 98; Burnhope, No 1-90-0143, LEXIS at *24; Washburn
v. Becker, 186 IMI. App. 3d 629, 633, 542 N.E.2d 764, 767 (1989).
329. See Saetz v. Langan, No. 90-2217-V, at *7-*12 (D. Kan. Jan. 4, 1991) (LEXIS, Genfed
library, Dist fie) ("If the corporation is merely a shell, it is equitable, even if the shell may not
have been used to perpetrate a fraud, to subject its owner personally to the court's jurisdiction
to defend the acts he has done on behalf of his shell.").
330. See Home-Stake Prod. v. Talon Petroleum, C.A., 907 F.2d 1012, 1017 (10th Cir. 1990)
(court could not find any Oklahoma cases discussing the fiduciary shield doctrine, but noted
that even if the courts adopted the doctrine, they would not apply it if the corporation is
merely an alter ego of the individual); McClelland, 729 F. Supp. at 1319.
331. See Warren v. Dynamics Health Equip. Mfg., 483 F. Supp. 788, 792 (M.D. Tenn.
1980).
332. See Stuart v. Spademan, 772 F.2d 1185, 1197 (5th Cir. 1985) (applying Texas law);
Saktides, 742 F. Supp. at 386.
333. See Segil v. Gloria Marshall Mgmt., 568 F. Supp. 915, 919 (C.D. Utah 1983).
334. See Miller Brewing Co. v. Landau, 616 F. Supp. 1285, 1289-90 (E.D. Wis. 1985).
335. See Ten Mile Indus. Park v. Western Plains Serv., 810 F.2d 1518, 1527 (10th Cir.
1987) (applying Wyoming law).
336. 730 F. Supp. 126 (N.D. IMI. 1989).
337. Id at 135-36 (quoting Marine Midland Bank v. Miller, 664 F.2d 899, 903 (2d Cir.
1981)).
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that have reached this conclusion include I1linois, 33 8 Indiana,339 Maryland,3 °
Minnesota, 341 New Mexico, 342 Pennsylvania, 343 and the District of Colum-
bia.344 In Torco Oil, the Illinois district court stated that the doctrine should
not be applied automatically, but instead, a court should "analyze the particular
facts in light of the ultimate consideration of fairness before deciding'whether
the doctrine should bar jurisdiction.
345
In addition, the district court of Pennsylvania, in Rittenhouse & Lee v.
338. See West Coast Video Enters., No. 90 C 1236, LEXIS at *29; Young v. Connecticut
Dual Life Ins., No. 90 C 254, at *6-*7 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 14, 1990) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist
file) (mem.); FBNFood Serme, No. 90 C 1001, LEXIS at *6; In re Mahurkar, 750 F. Supp. at
335; Torco Oil, 730 F. Supp. at 135; Continental IL Nat'l Bank, No. 88 C 7703, LEXIS at *7;
Veal Assocs., No. 86 C 7138, LEXIS; Hyatt Int'l Corp. v. Inversiones Los Jabillos, 558 F.
Supp. 932, 936 (N.D. iI. 1982); Washburn, 186 Ill. App. 3d at 633, 542 N.E.2d at 766-67.
339. See Ryan v. Chayes Va., Inc., 553 N.E.2d 1237, 1240 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990).
340. See Zeman, 717 F. Supp. at 376-77. An individual's contacts with state should not be
considered the individual's for jurisdictional purposes when: (1) he "has pursued conduct in a
state solely at the direction of the corporation in furtherance of the corporation's interest; (2)
he has not pursued a personal interest in the state that was direct and substantial; and (3) he
has not diverted significantly from the corporate purpose and policies while in the state...."
Id. However, a court should consider the individual's contacts as the individual's own when:
(1) the individual has "derived a direct and substantial financial benefit from the business he
conducts in the state," or (2) the individual "diverted, even unintentionally, from the purpose
or policies of his employer to the extent that it can be said that his conduct was independent."
Id at 377.
341. See Garber, No. 4-86-740, LEXIS at *22.
342. See Allen v. Toshiba Corp., 599 F. Supp. 381, 384 (D. N.M. 1984).
343. See United States v. Geri-Care, Inc., No. 89-5720, at *8-*9 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 29, 1990)
(LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file) (mem.); Kane Communications v. Norman Klombers, No.
87-6594, at *7-*10 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 9, 1988) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist fie) (mem.);
Minigraph, Inc. v. Qualitech Computer Centers, No. 86-5869, at *17 (E.D. Pa. June 30, 1987)
(LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file); Rittenhouse & Lee, No. 83-5996, LEXIS at *13-*15 & n.6
(there is no "hard and fast" rule regarding the application of the fiduciary shield doctrine);
Moran, 640 F. Supp. at 434. In Moran, the court concluded that:
[A] hard and fast rule mandating that such activity should not be considered is ap-
propriate in the determination required under the due process clause. The court
must determine whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction is reasonable under all
of the underlying circumstances. In some situations it may be appropriate to con-
sider activity that an individual undertakes on behalf of a corporation. Where the
corporate officer personally engages in egregious activity that would subject him or
her to individual liability, the corporate cloak should not necessarily provide a de-
fense to personal jurisdiction when it provides no defense to liability. On the other
hand, the fact that the activity was undertaken on behalf of a corporation should be
considered in assessing the significance of the activity as it bears on whether the
individual purposely established minimum contacts in the forum state .... Disre-
garding activity undertaken on behalf of a corporation regardless of the circum-
stances would be inconsistent with the flexibility inherent in the jurisprudence of
personal jurisdiction since the Supreme Court decided International Shoe."
Id. (citations omitted).
344. See American Directory Serv. Agency v. Amy Beam, 131 F.R.D. 635, 641 (D.D.C.
1990).
345. Torco Oil, 730 F. Supp. at 135.
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Dollars & Sense, 34 concluded that taking a flexible approach with regard to the
fiduciary shield doctrine was consistent with "recent Supreme Court pronounce-
ments., 347 The court stated:
In Keeton, for example, the Court noted that jurisdiction over an em-
ployee does not automatically follow from jurisdiction over his corpo-
rate employer. At the same time, however, the Court rejected "the
suggestion that employees who act in their official capacity are some-
how shielded from suit in their individual capacity." Thus, the court
appears to have rejected any per se rule with respect to the corporate
jurisdictional shield.34 8
The Rittenhouse & Lee court provided a list of several factors that should
be considered by courts in determining whether the fiduciary shield doctrine
should be applied. These include: "the extent and nature of a corporate officer's
personal participation in the tortious conduct; the nature and quality of the of-
ficer's forum contacts; and the officer's role in the corporate structure."
349
Another restriction imposed by courts in Alabama, 3 ° New Jersey35 1 and
Pennsylvania 35 2 is that the determination of whether to apply the doctrine de-
pends upon whether the actions taken by the corporate officials were within or
without the forum state. In Educational Testing Service v. Katzman,35 3 the New
Jersey district court stated that:
[A]ctions taken within the forum state by a corporate official in his
official capacity may be considered for purposes of establishing juris-
diction over him in his individual capacity. However, actions taken by
an individual in his corporate capacity outside the forum state are not
necessarily enough to establish jurisdiction over the individual.
3 4
Finally, courts in Tennessee355 and North Carolina 35 6 have limited the
346. No. 83-5996 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 15, 1987) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file) (mem.).
347. Id at *14-*15.
348. Idk (citations omitted) (quoting Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, 465 U.S. 770, 781 n. 13
(1984)).
349. Id at *13 n.6.
350. See Brooks, 453 So. 2d 349, 354-55 (Ala. 1984) (fiduciary shield doctrine applies only
to nonresident corporate officials who have never been in Alabama and who had never "per-
sonally 'performed any act or omitted to perform any act in Alabama which resulted in tor-
tious injury in Alabama."' (quoting Thames v. Gunter-Dunn, Inc., 373 So. 2d 640, 642 (Ala.
1979) (emphasis added))).
351. See Educational Testing Serv., 631 F. Supp. at 559.
352. See Rittenhouse & Lee, No. 83-5996, LEXIS at *13-*14 ("[lit may be proper to con-
sider an officer's corporate acts when the activity was taken within the forum. If, however, the
officer's acts were performed outside the forum, corporate activity should not be part of a
jurisdictional inquiry.").
353. 631 F. Supp. 550 (D.N.J. 1986).
354. Id. at 559 (emphasis added).
355. See Warren, 483 F. Supp. at 793.
356. See North Carolina v. Alexander & Alexander Servs., 685 F. Supp. 114, 116 (E.D.
N.C. 1988) ("fiduciary shield doctrine does not protect a person when that person has direct
personal involvement in the activities that give rise to the cause of action").
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application of the fiduciary shield doctrine to situations where the corporate offi-
cials have had no direct contacts with the forum state. These courts have rea-
soned that, if an official has no direct contacts with the forum state, "it may be
unreasonable, given only his relationship to the corporation that may have such
contacts, to conclude that he would be subject to the personal jurisdiction of the
court. Otherwise every [official] of a corporation would be subject to the per-
sonal jurisdiction of the courts in every state where the corporation is doing
business."
357
Courts across the country have imposed several different types of limita-
tions upon the fiduciary shield doctrine. The one limitation that appears to be
consistent with the Supreme Court's holding in Calder, is that the doctrine
should not be applied to shield corporate officials from the exercise of personal
jurisdiction when they commit intentional torts directed at residents of forum
states.
VI. CONCLUSION
The United States Supreme Court has established that the due process
clause of the United States Constitution requires that the exercise of personal
jurisdiction over non-residents comport with "'traditional notions of fair play
and substantial justice.' "358 In addition to requiring that non-residents have
"minimum contacts" with the forum states, the Supreme Court has stated that
non-residents must have purposefully availed themselves of the benefits and
privileges of the forum states' laws.
35 9
When corporate officials conduct activities with forum states solely on be-
half of the corporations that employ them, it is the corporations, not the individ-
ual corporate officials, that purposefully avail themselves of the forum states'
laws. As a result, the exercise of personal jurisdiction over the corporate officials
is improper since the essential component of purposeful availment is lacking.
This is the situation which is addressed by the fiduciary shield doctrine.
The fiduciary shield doctrine recognizes the fundamental unfairness in as-
serting personal jurisdiction over corporate officials who have not purposefully
availed themselves of the benefits and privileges of the forum states' laws. The
doctrine shields corporate officials from jurisdiction, when jurisdiction is based
on acts that were taken solely in their corporate capacities.
The doctrine should not, however, be applied in all cases. The United
357. Warren, 483 F. Supp. at 793 ("On the other hand, if the corporate structure is being
used as a vehicle for the conduct of business by an individual who has total control over
corporate activities, including the activities giving rise to the suit, then the existence of the
corporate form should not immunize him from the jurisdictional contacts of the corpora-
tion."); accord Alexander & Alexander Servs., 685 F. Supp. at 116.
358. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (quoting Milliken v.
Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
359. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958).
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States Supreme Court's opinion in Calder v. Jones 360 should be interpreted as
holding that the fiduciary shield doctrine cannot be applied to shield corporate
officials from personal jurisdiction when they engage in intentional torts. It
would be fundamentally unfair to apply the doctrine to shield corporate officials
from personal jurisdiction when those officials alledgedly commit intentional
torts. These overall concerns for fairness outweigh any unfairness that may re-
sult by exercising jurisdiction over corporate officials who lack the requiste pur-
poseful availment in their individual capacities. On the other hand, the doctrine
should be applied to shield corporate officials from jurisidiction when they are
charged with acts other than intentional torts, since the unfairness associated
with exercising jurisdiction over officials who lack purposeful availment is not
outweighed by this overall concern for fairness.
Consequently, the fiduciary shield doctrine should be considered as a com-
ponent of the constitutional due process analysis and should be used by courts to
achieve a fair result in the exercise of personal jurisdiction over corporate offi-
cials. Since the law regarding the fiduciary shield doctrine has been very uncer-
tain after the Calder decision, corporate officials cannot structure their conduct
with minimum assurance as to where that conduct will or will not subject them
to suit. As a result, the due process rights of corporate officials are being vio-
lated. These rights will continue to be violated until the United States Supreme
Court clarifies the law regarding this doctrine. Only then will corporate officials
be certain as to whether the actions they take on behalf of their corporations
subject them to personal jurisdiction.
Kristin A. Tibbitts*
360. 465 U.S. 783 (1984).
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